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Law, Authority, and Gender in Post-
Revolutionary Iran
LOUISE HALPERt
"[T]hinking is fundamentally not an individual matter
but a collective matter, just as knowledge is a collective and
ongoing matter."'
INTRODUCTION
In an earlier paper, 2 I wrote of how the politics of the
Iranian Revolution ultimately created a space in which
women could act to improve their situation inside the
boundaries of the post-revolutionary regime of religious
law. In this Article, I will suggest why the legal regime of
the Islamic Republic, while firmly based in religious law,
did not prove entirely resistant to the improvement women
required.
My suggestion in fact relates to a larger question-one
posed in all too many contexts today. That question can be
stated as the relationship of Islam to a particular political
t Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law. My thanks to
Liz Bucar, Mark Drumbl, Marie Failinger and her anonymous reviewer, Roja
Fazaeli, Bernard Freamon, Nikki Keddie and Ziba Mir-Hosseini, whose
comments on drafts of this paper I found particularly useful, as well as to the
participants in the panel on Islam and Family Law at the 2004 Annual Meeting
of the Middle East Studies Association in San Francisco, and participants in the
Feminist Legal Theory Workshop at Emory Law School in February 2006 and
in particular, its convener, Martha Albertson Fineman. I am grateful also to
Linda Newell of the Washington & Lee University Law Library, for her help in
gathering materials, to Mariam Tadros, W&L '07, for research assistance, and
to Ali Korangy, Ph.D. candidate in Persian Literature, Harvard University, for
his assistance in finding and translating Iranian Persian-language newspaper
sources.
1. Interview by Dariush Sajjadi with Abdolkarim Soroush, on Homa TV
(Mar. 9, 2006), available at http://www.drsoroush.com/English/Interviews/E-
INT-HomaTV.html.
2. Louise Halper, Law and Women's Agency in Post-Revolutionary Iran, 28
HARv. J.L. & GENDER 85 (2005).
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ideology or, even more pointedly, as the "essential" nature
of Islam. Too often, these questions are answered with
reference to a text that is said to require no interpretation
or to a law that speaks for itself. As lawyers, we know-
indeed it is precisely our business to know-that
interpretation is endless and that law speaks with, but also
through, many voices, each one distinct. My argument is
that the law of Islam, like the religion itself, is protean in
practice and, more than that, is capable, like any religion, of
being revolutionary or reactionary, severe or flexible. Thus,
over the centuries of its development, its legal scholars have
managed to provide religious guidance to complex and
sophisticated societies dealing with changing social
realities. In this, Islamic law does not differ from other
forms of law; religious law, even shari'a, the revealed law,
is instantiated and interpreted within a political context.
Islamic law plays a role in the life of each observing
Muslim. The common wisdom in Islam is that state and
religion are one, and that one is law. Indeed, Patricia Crone
writes that law is at "the heart of Islam in all its forms." 3
Thus the common wisdom is that Muslim societies suffer
politically because the separation of the political state and
institutional religion, the product of the Reformation in the
historical west, never occurred in Muslim states, which had
no Reformation.4 Hence, according to this story, religious
law continued to govern there long after civil society
emerged elsewhere. When the Muslim world was exposed to
Western ideology, the "shari'a state"-a state fully governed
by law revealed over time to the Prophet Mohammad-
continued as the desideratum of anti-modernist
fundamentalists. And it was thought that such a state,
should it ever come to exist, would be constrained-to the
particular detriment of women-by religious law that
emerged in the seventh century and is misogynistic and
hostile to women's equality claims.
This discussion has great relevance to Iran, where what
Robin Wright calls "The Last Great Revolution" took place
3. PATRICIA CRONE, MEDIEVAL ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT 8 (2004).
4. See Mohammad Nafissi, Reformation as a General Ideal Type: A
Comparative Outline, 6 MAX WEBER STUD. 69, 70-72 (2006) for citations to some
of this literature.
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more than a quarter-century ago. 5 According to the Islamist
groups that succeeded in taking power, political
transformation was intended to effect governance by
shari'a. In the construction of the post-revolutionary state,
there was no expressed claim of the discovery of a new legal
system, no jurisprudential search for law that matched the
times of the sort that led to the Code Napoleon or the Soviet
legal code. Instead, the aim of the new leaders of Iran was
to govern by revelation, as expressed in the Qu'ran, the
word of God revealed to his Prophet Mohammad, as well as
the sunna, the traditions of the Prophet, and the time-
honored practice of interpretation by religious scholars.
Here, in other words, those who made the new state
claimed the law to be applied predated the state that was to
apply it; indeed, application of that law was the whole
purpose of the state.
In the decades since Western colonialism and
imperialism penetrated the Muslim world, shari'a had
been, to varying extents, cut off from quotidian juristic
practice as civil codes replaced religious jurisprudence in
areas considered central to the projects of modernization.
One may say that at least since the Mecelle, the 1869
codification of Ottoman imperial law, the history of shari'a
in the Muslim world is in large part a history of
displacement, replacement and distortion. Contract and
injury, otherwise parts of shari'a, were largely codified, at
least in respect to commerce and to crime.6 Juristic
religious scholarship did retain its place in the law of
marriage, family, inheritance and endowment, even after
codification. 7 But even there it was constrained, both
directly by metropolitan law in the colonial situation and
indirectly in the control that even the formally non-colonial
state assumed over marriage, once simply been a contract
between private parties.8
5. ROBIN WRIGHT, THE LAST GREAT REVOLUTION: TURMOIL AND
TRANSFORMATION IN IRAN (2000).
6. Joseph Schacht, Problems of Modern Islamic Legislation, STUDIA
ISLAMICA, 1960, at 108.
7. See id. at 116.
8. Thus, for example, Reza Shah, the first Pahlavi dynast, while leaving
religious law its scope in respect to marriage and family, nonetheless required
that marriages be registered with the state, thus forcing recognition of state
2007] 1139
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In the Iranian Revolution, more than a century later,
that process reversed itself. A civil code containing both
public and private law and constraining, though not
replacing, the Islamic law of marriage and family, was
eliminated and replaced by shari'a as the law of the state.
In the West, that turn was largely understood as a re-turn;
religious fanatics were attempting to recuperate a bygone
world, figuratively turning their backs on the modernity
that the Shah represented. 9 But perhaps the "shari'a state"
is not a return, but something new, a public law of shari'a
addressing public necessities and the realities of siyasat,
political administration. 10
Having discussed the post-revolutionary exercise of
Iranian women's agency in the earlier paper, here I propose
to discuss at greater length shari'a and the authority of the
state, as well as the applicability of both to gender issues,
and in particular the law of marriage and divorce in Iran.
In the first section, I begin by laying out the relationship
between law and state in Shi'ism. In the second section, I
briefly describe aspects of the Iranian context: First, the
political and economic background of the relationship
between religion and authority and then how the views of
the most political of Shi'a religious leaders-Ayatollah
Khomeini-changed in regard to authority in the Islamic
state as he moved from opposition to revolution to
leadership of the new state. The third section looks at
women and law in the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). I
begin by discussing the gender politics of the revolutionary
beginnings of the IRI. I then look at the impact of shari'a
law on women in post-revolutionary Iran. Finally, I
examine, with some particularity, two changes in the law of
marriage and divorce that occurred in the nineties, after
Khomeini's death in 1989 and before the 1997 election of
Mohammad Khatami as President of the IRI. These
changes were intended to provide some guarantee of
control, however indirect, over marriage. NIKKI R. KEDDIE, ROOTS OF
REVOLUTION 97-98 (1981).
9. See, e.g., GARY SICK, ALL FALL DOWN: AMERICA'S TRAGIC ENCOUNTER WITH
IRAN 85 (1985) (referring to "Khomeini's radical medievalism").
10. A shari'a of the state was indeed the aim of the great 13th-century Sunni
scholar Ibn Taimiya, but neither he nor other scholars ever succeeded in
creating it. SAMI ZUBAIDA, LAW AND POWER IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD 98-100 (2003).
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financial stability to divorced women. They support the
view that religious law may, in a particular political
context, allow for flexibility with respect to issues of concern
to women. I end by concluding that religious law in IRI did
indeed respond to political and state necessities.
I. SHI'ISM AND STATE
A. The Founding of Islam
In Islam, "[1]aw is essentially religious . . . [and]
constitutes the ideal social blueprint for the 'good society'."'1
But the prescriptions of shari'a are not actually a law of
governance, 12 for they apply to contracts, injuries, and
family relations, as well as to specifically religious matters,
such as the manner of prayer and the religious duties of
believers. 13 For the purposes of the state, shari'a had to be
supplemented with urf, custom, and siyasat, the practical
administration of matters of public interest like war and
foreign relations, provincial governance, market regulation,
forms of land-holding, and even crimes that were, in some
character, political.' 4
Mohammad Nafissi says that, historically, the
formative period that "fused state and religion"' 5 ended in
11. JOHN L. ESPOSITO, ISLAM: THE STRAIGHT PATH 74-75 (3d ed. 1998). Still,
it is wise to avoid the error of "assuming that all aspects of Islamic tradition
and Muslim lives can be explained by reference to law." ASHK P. DAHLEN,
ISLAMIC LAW, EPISTEMOLOGY AND MODERNITY: LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN
CONTEMPORARY IRAN 39 (Shahrough Akhavi ed. 2003).
12. See ZUBAIDA, supra note 10, at 202.
13, The portion of revealed law that deals with relationships among people
is called mu'amalat and that which deals with relationships between the
believer and God is called ibadat. Ziba Mir-Hosseini, The Construction of
Gender in Islamic Legal Thought and Strategies for Reform, 1 HAWWA 1, 11
(2003).
14. Majid Khadduri, The Nature and Sources of Islamic Law, 22 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 3 (1954). This is not to say that shari'a recognized "municipal law
dissociated from the ethical and religious sense." DAHLEN, supra note 11, at 48
n.11. No law in opposition to shari'a was permissible, but shari'a could be
supplemented.
15. Mohammad Nafissi, Reformation, Islam, and Democracy: Evolutionary
and Antievolutionary Reform in Abrahamic Religions, 25 COMP. STUDIES OF
ASIA, AFR. & MIDDLE EAST 407, 407 (2005).
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661 with the death of the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law
Ali, the fourth and last of the Prophet's successors who had
also been one of his companions. The Prophet began his
mission in 610 and, by his death in 632, ruled the Arab
trading city of Medina for ten years.
After the Prophet's death, Abu Bakr, his companion
and father-in-law, became caliph, or successor, followed by
Omar, another companion. Ali acquiesced in these choices,
but left Arabia to settle in Iraq after the selection of the
third caliph, Othman. When Othman died in 655, Ali took
his place, claiming to be more than a "political and
administrative authority."16  Because of Ali's blood
relationship to the Prophet, a group of prominent Muslims
considered him to be more than a caliph, or vice-regent, but
rather the first Imam, "a person who in [both] worldly and
other-worldly affairs is the successor to the Prophet, and is
the leader of people."'1 7 This group became known as the
Shi'at Ali, or Ali's party, hence the term Shi'i.
Ali was murdered in the year 661 by a kinsman of
Othman, after ruling for six years, ending the "golden age
fusion of. . . temporal and spiritual authority."' 8 When Ali
died, the caliphate was taken by his enemy Mu'awiya, the
first of the Umayyad dynasty. But Ali's son, Hossein-the
Prophet's grandson and the third Imam' 9-- continued to
urge his own right to leadership by descent. When Hossein
fought Yazid-Mu'awiya's son and the second Umayyad
caliph, members of the Shi'at Ali who promised to come to
his aid, did not. 20 Their guilt and penitence at his death
"marked the true beginning of Shi'i Islam. ''21
16. HAMID DABASHI, AUTHORITY IN IsLAM 89 (1989).
17. Id. at 101, 159 (citing ABU MANSUR AL-BAGHDADI, AL-FARQ BAYN AL-
FIRAQ 280 (1954)).
18. Id. at 413.
19. Ali's eldest son, Hassan, renounced his claim to the caliphate, but was
still regarded by Shi'is as having spiritual power, and is thus considered the
second Imam. Id. at 8.
20. Id. at 9. It is said that Hossein knew that his struggle was doomed, but
went forward to the battle anyway and died a martyr, making him a symbol of
resistance to injustice and arbitrary power, as are his mother Fatima, his sister
Zeinab, and the companions who died with him in 680 at Karbala, today an
Iraqi shrine city. Id. at 9, 15.
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It was then that the split in the umma, or Muslim
community, over the succession to the Prophet led to a
separation between religious and political authority that
was never, in practice, restored.
Shi'ism has always been a minority wing of Islam "and
usually the opposition." 22 The Shi'a, who are themselves
divided into a number of groups contesting who was the
proper inheritor of Muhammad's legacy, 23 are in agreement
that descendants of the Prophet, rather than non-
descendants, should have been accepted as the Prophet's
successors by the community of his followers. For Iranian
Shi'is, the successors of the Prophet are his descendants,
including Ali-who was his nephew and his son-in-law-his
grandsons-Hassan and Hossein-and the other nine
Imams who descended from Hossein. 24
21. Id. at 20. That guilt and penitence is on view each year in the public
ceremonies during
Muharram, the month of mourning, when religious fervour is greatest
over the passion and martyrdom of the Imam Husain... The religious
ceremonies and dramatic performances [commemorating the Karbala
events] . . . are a perennial re-enactment of courage, martyrdom and
resistance to an unjust state. From the point of view of mobilization of
opposition to the state, this period had always been recognized as
potentially inflammatory because popular passions run high.
VANESSA MARTIN, CREATING AN ISLAMIC STATE: KHOMEINI AND THE MAKING
OFA NEW IRAN 63 (2000).
In Iran, all ten of the first days of Muharram are devoted to collective
commemorations of the events at Karbala, from Hossein's arrival there on the
first day through the deaths of his companions and relatives on the following
days, to his own martyrdom on Ashura, the tenth day of Muharram. On each
day, another death is described and acted out before crowds in public in a series
of passion plays called taziyeh. Ashura is the climax of these ceremonies.
Because the Islamic calendar is lunar, Muharram, the first month of the Islamic
year, comes at a different time each year of the Georgian calendar. In 1963, it
fell in June, the same month that Ayatollah Khomeini gave his first public
speech in opposition to the regime, comparing the Shah to Yaz. In 1978, when
Muharram commemorations led to the climactic overthrow of the Shah, it fell in
December. Khomeini returned in February 1979. See id.
22. HEINZ HALM, SHI'A ISLAM: FROM RELIGION TO REVOLUTION, at viii (Allison
Brown trans., Markus Wiener 1997) (1994).
23. There are also Shi'is who follow other Imams, like the Ismailis of the
Indian subcontinent, who follow the Seventh Imam. Id. at 24.
24. SEYED MOHAMMAD ALI TAGHAVI, THE FLOURISHING OF ISLAMIC
REFORMISM IN IRAN 141 (2005). These twelve, with the Prophet himself and his
daughter, Fatima, Ali's wife, are the ahl al-bayt, or people of the household of
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After the death of Hossein, none of the nine subsequent
Imams claimed the caliphate as Ali and Hossein had. In
873, the Twelfth Imam, the Mahdi, disappeared from
human sight. He is understood to be hidden from view,
present but unseen, and will someday reappear and
establish God's rule on earth, putting an end to all injustice.
Thus, "through the doctrinal agency of the 'Hidden Imam,'.
. . the charismatic energy engendered during Muhammad's
time became permanently present and active for the rest of
Islamic history. '25 Though hidden from view, the Imam
remains "a person who in [both] worldly and other-worldly
affairs is the successor to the Prophet, and is the leader of
people."26
B. Law and Governance
Shi'is who follow the Hidden Imam are called Twelvers;
they are the dominant religious group in Iran. The Jafari
madhab, or school of Islamic law, is followed by Twelver
Shi'is and is, according to the Constitution of the IRI, the
official and unalterable basis of law in Iran.27 The Jafari
school had its origins about a century after the failure of the
Prophet's line to succeed him to political power. Jafar al-
Sadiq, the sixth Imam and a learned scholar, developed the
basic doctrine of imamat, the "need of the Muslim
community to be permanently guided by the rightful
leadership of a descendant of 'Ali. ' ' 28 This rule of
governance is an article of faith for Shi'is. The descendant
the prophet. They are also known as the Perfect Fourteen and it is their
traditions that comprise the sunna followed by Shi'i madhab, or school of law,
dominant in Iran. Id.
25. DABASHI, supra note 16, at 120.
26. Id. at 101, 159 (citing Abu Mansur al-Baghdadi, AL-FARQ BAYN AL-FIRAQ
280 (1954)).
27. Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri'i Isla'mai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic
Republic of Iran] 12 [1980], available at http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-
info/Government/constitution-l.html [hereinafter, CONSTITUTION].
28. DABASHI, supra note 16, at 153-54.
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"is more than a ... pious man of learning. He is a divinely
inspired possessor of a special sum of knowledge of religion
that is passed on before his death to the following imam."29
In separating the caliphate from the imamat, Jafar
maintained the claims of the continued existence of
charismatic authority in the form of the Prophet's
descendants, against the Sunni caliphs' acceptance of mere
political succession to the Prophet's rule and against the
Sunni ulama's institutionalization of revelation in the form
of their own control over shari'a.30
Shi'is believe the Imam has the right to rule Muslims,
not only spiritually but temporally; any other government is
"a deviation from the divine commands."31 The Imam "is
more than a ...pious man of learning. He is a divinely
inspired possessor of a special sum of knowledge of religion
that is passed on before his death to the following imam. ''32
And when the Twelfth Imam went into occultation, there
simply was no government on earth whose legitimacy
derived from anything more than its relative superiority to
fitna, or anarchy. Thus, while the apparent ruler must be
tolerated in order to avoid the hell of fitna, the caliph had
no other claim to allegiance. For Shi'is, a minority without
political power, there was no single legitimate political
leader equivalent to the Sunni caliph, because political, as
well as spiritual, authority was rightfully the Imam's.
Jafar was not only an Imam, but among the first of the
Shi'i muhaddithun, those who collected and validated the
practices and knowledge of the Prophet, as related by his
Imamic descendants and those of his household.33 These
constituted the Shi'a sunna and were collected in hadiths-
anecdotes of words, acts, and deeds-as guides to the
actions of believers. 34 Over time, some muhaddithun
became true jurists consulted by the Shi'i community as to
29. DAHLEN, supra note 11, at 53 (emphasis omitted).
30. DABASHI, supra note 16, at 154.
31. Shahrough Akhavi, Contending Discourses in Shii Law on the Doctrine
of Wilayat al-Faqih, 29 IRANIAN STUD. 229, 229 (1996).
32. DAHLEN, supra note 11, at 53 (emphasis omitted).
33. HALM, supra note 22, at 24.
34. Sunni hadith do not include the sunna of the twelve Imamic
descendants of the Prophet, but do contain sunna of the companions of the
Prophet. ZUBAIDA, supra note 10, at 76.
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appropriate and correct practices in all areas of life, a
delegation approved by Jafar.35 They relied not only upon
the Qu'ran and hadiths, but also systematized and
rationalized "the increasing body of judgments, arguments
and disputations . . . making explicit the criteria of
judgement and the validity of argument. '36
These religious scholars were the ancestors of the
Twelve Shi'i jurists who, though they did not hold state
authority, came to lead the community of believers, even
when they were under the political authority of a Sunni
caliph. 37 When the Twelfth Imam disappeared with no
explicit designation of a successor, these religious scholars
became central to the life of the Shi'i community which,
until then, had possessed infallible guidance. In the absence
of the Imam, and with the consequent necessity for the
"postponement" of just rule until his return,38 Shi'is relied
upon mujtahids-scholars capable of ijtihad, or
interpretation-to guide the community in its practice of
shari'a.39 Inevitably, because the true guide to both religion
and politics was inaccessible, the reliance on the mujtahids
was also political. So while the Shi'i ulama denied their
political ruler religious authority, just as the Sunni uluma
did,40 they themselves were not adjuncts of the state. The
strength of their claim lay in their interpretive power and
the fact that interpretation "was restricted only by . .
revelation."41 The Shi'i ulama, like the Sunni, were not
interpreting the law of the state, but stood aside from it.
But unlike their counterparts their authority stood as a
potential threat to any actually existing political authority,
35. See HALM, supra note 22, at 90 (alteration to original).
36. ZUBAIDA, supra note 10, at 18.
37. See SHAHROUGH AKHAVI, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY IRAN
10 (1980).
38. See Nikki R. Keddie, Is Shiism Revolutionary?, in THE IRANIAN
REVOLUTION AND THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 113 (Nikki R. Keddie & Eric Hooglund
eds., 2d ed. 1986).
39. From the thirteenth century onward, Shi'is, unlike Sunnis, accepted
ijtihad as a duty that could be undertaken by a specific group of persons trained
in its exercise. DAHLEN, supra note 11, at 73.
40. See supra text accompanying notes 17-29.
41. DAHLEN, supra note 11, at 50.
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Sunni or Shi'a, and their guardianship of shari'a a
challenge to the legitimacy of the state.
II. RELIGION, AUTHORITY AND MODERNITY IN IRAN
A. The Expansion of Religious Authority in the Safavid
(1501-1736) and Qajar Dynasties (1779-1925)
When the Safavid dynasty came to power in Persia at
the start of the 16th century, most Persians were Sunni.
But the Safavids, "millenarian charismatic[s]" 42  who
claimed descent from the Prophet, actively promoted
Twelver Shi'ism, and are responsible for its current position
in Iran. They invited Shi'i mujtahids from Iraq and
Lebanon to their kingdom. These figures dominated
religious education, founding juristic dynasties that
continue to the present day.
The Safavids fell to Afghan invaders in 1736. 43 These
Afghan Sunnis were hostile to Shi'ism and to its ulama,
which "withdr[e]w into quiescence." 44 Many Shi'i mujtahids
moved back into Iraq, then part of the Ottoman Empire. 45
The Ottomans, though Sunni, were multi-cultural in
orientation and did not interfere with the religious practices
of those within their domain; the leading Shi'i mujtahids
were thus outside Persia during the eighteenth century.
When Afghan rule collapsed, and with it central
government, a period of tribal and regional rule continued
until the end of the eighteenth century, when a Turkmen
tribal leader, Aqa Mohammad Khan Qajar, was able to
crown himself Shah, succeeded by others of his line. 46 The
Shi'i ulama were reconciled to the Qajars who claimed to be
42. Akhavi, supra note 31, at 6.
43. See AMIR ARJOMAND, THE TURBAN FOR THE CROWN: THE ISLAMIC
REVOLUTION IN IRAN 18 (1988).
44. Michael M. J. Fischer, Legal Postulates in Flux: Justice, Wit &
Hierarchy in Iran, in LAW AND ISLAM IN THE MIDDLE EAST 115, 123 (Daisy Hilse
Dwyer ed. 1990).
45. See HALM, supra note 22, at 113-14.
46. He was assassinated within the year and was followed to the throne by
his nephew, Fath Ali Shah, who then reigned for almost forty years.
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devout Shi'is, but did not allow them the Safavids' claim of
religious leadership through descent from the Imam.47
At roughly the same time, the late-eighteenth century
triumph of the Usuli school of interpretation, led by Vahid
Behbehani, over the Akhbari school, institutionalized the
role of religious leaders as guardians of the Shi'i
community, regardless of who its political leader was. The
Akhbaris believed the revealed text required no interpretive
reasoning; the Usuli that religious scholars should interpret
the law for believers by exercise of their independentjudgment. 48 Added to the doctrine of taqlid, or emulation,
the victory of the Usuli required believers to adhere to a
mujtahid, whose interpretations authorized their behavior;
thus each individual Shi'i must choose a scholar by whosejudgment he or she would be guided.49
Eventually, every Shi'i was required to follow the
guidance of a mujtahid.50  Jafar's delegation ofjurisprudential authority to the ulama is the foundation of
their religious leadership of the Shi'i community,
understood to be at the direction of the Hidden Imam,51 who
represents a source of divine knowledge that can be
accessed by intellect. Unlike his Sunni counterpart, whose
thinking is acceptable only as part of a consensus of
scholars, the Shi'i religious jurist is potentially capable of
discerning the divine command himself, and for that reason
his decisions are binding on his followers. 52
The mujtahid provides a forum for his followers in
which disputes can be resolved. 53 His fatwa, or decision, is a
product of rationality, not revelation, and therefore not
47. HALM, supra note 22, at 116-17; DAHLEN, supra note 11, at 63. Arjomand
points out that Aqa Mohammad Khan did claim descent from the Safavids.
ARJOMAND, supra note 43, at 20.
48. DAHLEN, supra note 11, at 63.
49. MARTIN, supra note 21, at 116.
50. Id.
51. Id. The Imam, like his Prophetic progenitor, has received a delegation
from God. The Imam's deputization of the mujtahids is a lesser delegation as it
does not come directly from God.
52. DAHLEN, supra note 11, at 52.
53. The mujtahid's forum was independent of the state, as were shari'a
courts, guild tribunals, and other forms of private enforcement, at least until
Reza Shah's 1928 codification of civil law. ZUBAIDA, supra note 10, at 189-90.
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infallible, a new fatwa can supersede an old one.54 His
followers who obey the fatwa are not to be blamed if their
mujtahid is in error, since they may not rely upon their own
understandings, but are required to select a mujtahid to
follow. 55 The acceptance of fallibility, together with the
absence of precedential value of any fatwa after the death of
the mujtahid who proclaimed it, "gave great power to living
mujtahids."56
One can see the usefulness of such a doctrine to a
community that was ruled by outsiders and whose
continued existence could only be guaranteed by unity. It
assured the spiritual leaders of that community their
intellectual independence from political authority. 57 The
victory of the Usuli position secured the existence of an
independent and potentially activist body of religious
scholars who held themselves responsible for the spiritual
welfare of their followers, and thus were appropriately
involved in public issues, a position rejected by the defeated
Akhbaris.58
It was further accepted in the nineteenth century that
some particularly learned, intelligent, and just muitahids
might be pre-eminent among mujtahids and thus the source
of authority, or marja al-taqlid, for a great number of
believers. 59 A marja was the guardian of the Shi'i umma
and, in a conflict between marja and political authority, the
believer's duty was always to follow the Imam's rule, as
understood by the marja.60 (Whether the marja was acting
on behalf of the Imam, so there was always divine guidance
in the world, or whether some of the Imam's political
functions were simply unexercised, leaving no legitimate
54. Id. at 27.
55. See HALM, supra note 22, at 107-08.
56. Keddie, supra note 38, at 120.
57. ARJOMAND, supra note 43, at 14.
58. Hamid Algar, Religious Forces in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth Century
Iran, in 7 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF IRAN 705, 711-12 (Peter Avery et al. eds.,
1991).
59. The position is not granted hierarchically but by consensus of the
mujtahids; at various times, there have been eight living marja, as well as none
at all. Ziba Mir-Hosseini, The Islamic State: An Unfinished Project 5 (2002)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
60. See HALM, supra note 22, at 119-20.
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government at all during his occultation, remained a matter
of dispute. 61) A marja's interpretations were widely
followed, creating in effect, though not formally, a figure
whose pronouncements were weighty, important, and
possibly contrary to those of the political leader, the Shah. 62
The Twelver Shi'i clergy63 had both an autonomous
community-based means of support 64 and a claim to
independence from political authority. The situation of the
Shi'i community's minority status in the Islamic world,
together with the individual believer's duty to follow a
particular religious figure with the power, ability, and duty
to interpret sacred texts for their followers, gave religious
authority-authority which might even be located within a
different state entity-a political potential independent of
the state. Although this independence was hardly used,65 as
Halm says, "[T]he Hidden Imam was always a potential
challenger to the omnipotence of the king.., and the clergy
developed into a core of all potential opposition to the
absolute monarchy. ' 66
61. As Dahlen writes,
[T]he Shi'i ulama established an informal structure of authority
presided over by a single or multiple ... supreme model of emulation,
where in reality the jurist was in an intermediary position between
God and the individual believer, something that created theoretical
obstacles because of the inescapable presence of the hidden imam who
alone personified all supreme authority.
DAHLEN, supra note 11, at 90.
62. Keddie, supra note 38, at 169.
63. This word is obviously imprecise but refers to the body of Shi'i religious
figures who are empowered by their peers to interpret law for believers.
"Whereas Islam recognizes no strict clergy in the Christian sense of a body of
persons specially ordained to perform sacraments, the Shi'i evolution of ijtihad
de facto came very close to that, since it gave religious validity to the daily
practices of the individual believers." DAHLEN, supra note 11, at 89.
64. Khums, the tithe of a fifth of the Shi'i believer's income beyond
necessities, are paid to his or her mujtaha. Id. Of the khums, part was used for
the community's benefit, e.g., establishing religious schools, supporting
students, supporting locally-based and itinerant mullahs, and another part for
support of the mujtahid and, directly or indirectly, the marja. ZIBA MIR-
HOSSEINI, ISLAM AND GENDER: THE RELIGIOUS DEBATE IN CONTEMPORARY IRAN 12
(2000).
65. ARJOMAND, supra note 43, at 75.
66. HALM, supra note 42, at 110.
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Nonetheless, it was very clear that there was no actual
political authority adhering to the mujtahids and the issue
of their role vis-d-vis the state, while debated in the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, was more
theoretical than real. Thus, the ulama were silent, at least
until social pressures called for their response, in the late-
nineteenth century. During this period, the extent of the
potential political authority of the law's interpreters
continued to be under internal discussion, as was the form
and content of just government. 67
B. The Modernization of Authority
In the second half of the nineteenth century, Persia
found itself caught between competing empires, the British
and the Russian. Both attempted to gain influence there,
along with economic advantage. Though several attempts
were begun to modernize elements of society and
government by Qajar leaders, they were not successful, at
least in part because they were seen as capitulations to
outside influence, as indeed they often were. Local and
regional protests were heard against the economic and
military defeats imposed on the Qajars by the contending
imperial powers. 68
Opposition to foreign domination united both those who
were influenced by Western thought to seek political reform
of the monarchical system and its policies impoverishing
the local economy and those who wanted to exclude
Western influence in the interests of preserving the local
culture, practices, and economy. In practice, this meant
that reformers were often allied with the ulama who
"emerged as the proponents of the rising indigenous
nationalism which was expressed in terms of Islam."69 The
ulama were also tied to the bazaaris70 from whom much of
67. Gregory Rose, Velayat-e Faqih and the Recovery of Islamic Identity in the
Thought of Ayatollah Khomeini, in RELIGION AND POLITICS IN IRAN: SHI'ISM FROM
QUIETISM TO REVOLUTION 166, 175-76 (Nikki R. Keddie ed., 1983).
68. KEDDIE, supra note 8, at 43-48.
69. HOSSEIN BASHIRIYEH, THE STATE AND REVOLUTION IN IRAN: 1962-1982 at
9 (1984).
70. Keddie defines bazaaris as "not only those who had shops in the bazaar
but also those who carried on retail and export trade and manufacture of a
traditional rather than a modern type . . . [The term] has meaning in its
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their income flowed in a "natural alliance formed between
the nascent Iranian bourgeoisie and the clerical
establishment."71 The bazaaris were competing with
products from abroad and faced a decline in prices for
Iranian exports on the world market.7 2 These three
groups-reformers, ulama and bazaaris-were part of an
"alliance that has been responsible for so much
revolutionary activity in Iran since 1891." 73
The first national challenge to a monarch was the so-
called Tobacco Revolt of 1891, protesting Qajar Shah
Nasruddin's grant of a monopoly over tobacco to an
Englishman, not only its export, but its local production and
sale. 74 This concession affected an industry already in
existence, and the thousands of Iranians profiting from
production and distribution of tobacco. Massive protests
swept the country and within a few months, the
government had to backtrack. The marja of the day,
Ayatollah Mirza Hasan Shirazi, issued a fatwa forbidding
smoking, starting a nationwide boycott of tobacco products
joined by both men and women.7 5 This broad movement
forced the monarchy to cancel the concession and was the
start of a popular revolt in Iran which, within little more
than a decade, would lead to the creation of a constitution
and the beginnings of a modern state.
The constitutional movement of 1905-1911 wanted a
liberal constitutional monarchy, a mashruta (literally,
conditional rule76) a form being sought contemporaneously
within the neighboring Russian and Ottoman empires, and
involvement with petty trade, production, and banking of a largely traditional
or only slightly modernized nature . . . centering on bazaar areas and
traditional Islamic culture... [and] united in their resistance to dependence on
the West and the spread of Western ways," but not in themselves a class.
KEDDIE, supra note 8, at 226-27.
71. Hamid Dabashi, The End of Islamic Ideology, 67 Soc. RES. 475, 500
(2000).
72. KEDDIE, supra note 8, at 227.
73. Id.
74. Tobacco was one of the crops-along with cotton and opium-which were
coming to replace silk, wool and textiles as Iran's leading exports in the
nineteenth century. KEDDIE, supra note 8, at 50-51.
75. AZADEH KIAN-THIEBAUT, SECULARIZATION OF IRAN: A DOOMED FAILURE?
48 (Diffusion Peeters 1998).
76. ZUBAIDA, supra note 10, at 185.
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one conceptualized in all three countries as a move toward
modernization. Unlike the Tobacco Revolt, the
Constitutional Revolution, was based on "modern political
and social ideas: constitutionalism, establishment of a
parliament, freedom of speech, press, and associations,
restriction of the monarch's power, national independence,
and to a lesser extent, social justice."77
These new demands posed a dilemma for the ulama.
While the revolutionaries, whose leadership included
landlords, bazaar merchants, and tribal leaders,7 8 as well as
reformers, did not contemplate constitutional separation of
religion and state, nonetheless, the ulama were split. Some
supported the constitutionalists against the Qajars, while
others believed the kind of legislation a parliament might
draft could contradict shari'a and endanger the authority of
religious scholars. 79 Religious leaders who supported the
constitution theorized that since all temporal authorities
are imperfect in the absence of the Hidden Imam, "a
constitutional form of government that limits the ruler's
arbitrary power and grants people limited sovereignty was
less abhorrent than other forms."8 0
Among clerics who played a leadership role as
supporters of the constitutional revolution were Sayyid,8 '
Mohammad Tabataba'i, and Sayyid Abdallah Behbehani,
without whom the "first triumphs of the constitutionalists.
. . would have been unthinkable. '8 2 In response, the
constitution gave the ulama, through a parliamentary
committee of five mujtahids, the power to ensure
conformity of legislation with shari'a.8 3 This recognized an
77. AZADEH KIAN-THIEBAUT, supra note 75, at 50.
78. Gavin R. G. Hambly, The Pahlavi Autocracy: Riza Shah, 1921-1941, in 7
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF IRAN 213 (Peter Avery et. al. eds., 1991).
79. Akhavi, supra note 31, at 16; ARJOMAND, supra note 43, at 50-51.
80. Mohsen Milani, Shi'ism and the State in the Constitution of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, in POLITICAL CULTURE IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 139, (Samih K.
Farsoun et al. eds., 1992).
81. The term "sayyid" means descendant of the Prophet. MARTIN, supra note
21, at 233.
82. Algar, supra note 58, at 732-33.
83. BASHIRIYEH, supra note 69, at 9.
This provision of the constitution was referred to again in 1979 when the post-
revolution constitution was drawn up. HALM, supra note 22, at 126.
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official role for the ulama within the state, without
rejecting constitutionalism and representative government.
The hostility of other religious figures was attributable
to fear of the secular tendencies of some supporters of the
constitution.8 4  Shaykh Fazlullah Nuri, the leading
proponent of the constitutional creation of a committee of
mujtahids, came to believe the leaders of the Constitutional
Revolution sought a secular republic. He was hanged by the
constitutionalists after he joined monarchic forces in an
attempt to put down the constitution and parliament with
the aid of foreign troops.8 5
The leaders of the constitutional revolution, secular and
religious, would not realize the outcome they sought, a long-
lasting constitutional monarchy free of outside domination.
At the end of 1911, Russia and Britain acted to put an end
to a political movement that threatened their economic and
strategic interests in Iran. The troops of both countries
occupied Persian territory for the next decade,8 6 and the
Shah dissolved the Majles, the parliament. 87 While the 1906
constitution was, because of war, coup, and the Pahlavi
dynasty, not implemented until after World War II and
then only for eight years,88 it stood throughout the
twentieth century for the indigenous and modern self-
government that was the aim of most Iranians. At the same
time, the issue of the authority of the Shi'i clergy and
Islamic law within a constitutional state was never
resolved.
C. The Pahlavi Dynasty
1. Reza Shah. Though ineffective, the constitution
was a symbol of Iranian nationhood, such that the Pahlavi
84. ARJOMAND, supra note 43, at 79-80.
85. MANSOOR MOADDEL, CLASS, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE IRANIAN
REVOLUTION 149 (1993); ARJOMAND, supra note 43, at 54-55.
86. See KIAN-THIEBAUT, supra note 75, at 59-60.
87. Id.
88. Although the constitution was theoretically in effect under the Pahlavis,
in practice it was a dead letter. In particular, the provision for religious
supervision of legislation was never implemented. Akhavi, supra note 31, at
260.
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dynasty continued to claim an adherence to it, while its
opponents blamed their opposition the Pahlavis' failure to
uphold that constitution. Nor was this the only way in
which the constitution prefigured later events, for, in its
compromises between republicanism and religion, the
constitutional era can be seen as heralding the dilemmas of
the revolutionary and post-revolutionary period in which
the Islamic Republic is now embroiled.
When an Iranian cavalry officer, Reza Khan, soon to
become Reza Shah, seized the throne in 1926 (having
already been Persia's strong man for several years), Iran
was far from being a modern state. Under the Qajar Shahs
of the late nineteenth century, Iran was fought over by two
empires, the Russian and the British. Each offered the
usual imperial carrots and sticks to important figures in the
patrimonial Qajar regime, with the British generally
coming out ahead. In the first decade of the twentieth
century, a proto-nationalist constitutional revolution
attempted to create a constitutional monarchy and
introduce a variety of reforms within a religio-national
context. Women, for the first time, tried to play a role in
support of nationalist forces, though female suffrage was
strongly opposed by religious figures within the coalition
and agitation in that direction was stillborn. The
constitutional revolution failed, as Reza Pahlavi-with the
blessing of the British89 -became the strongman of the
state. Nonetheless, it remained an iconic reference point for
patriotic Iranians.
To gain support before taking the throne at the start of
1926, Reza Khan disarmed those suspicious of his religious
intentions with "ostentatious displays of religiosity"90 and
promises to preserve Islam, assuring the ulama that "he
would fulfill Islamic law and not institute radical
reforms."91 Thus, on the whole, the clergy supported Reza
89. This was a shift from the historical preference of the British "for weak
Qajar government." KEDDIE, supra note 8, at 186. But Reza Khan was, as the
Americans then described him privately, "an antidote to Bolshevism," now
making its appearance on Iran's borders. Id. at 89 (citing a State Department
memo of 1921). Indeed Reza Khan thereafter defeated the Jangalis movement's,
indigenous northern forces who had declared the "Soviet Republic of Gilan."
Algar, supra note 58, at 738.
90. ARJOMAND, supra note 43, at 81.
91. KEDDIE, supra note 8, at 91.
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Khan's rise to power as a counter to the forces of
secularism, nationalism, and socialism. 92 Once in power,
Reza Khan did not serve their purposes. Education was
taken out of the hands of religious figures and a secular
educational system created. 93  Public schools were
established, though there were never more than a quarter
of a million children in public elementary school at any
period during the time of Reza Shah, when the population
was about fifteen or sixteen million.94 Tehran University
was founded and its faculty of law became the only route to
the civil judiciary, 95 except for family and marital courts
which remained within the jurisdiction of the ulama. At the
same time, a new historiography-teaching the pre-Islamic
roots and successes of the Persian people-became part of a
national curriculum, as well as official discourse. The
state's assertion of its right to control vaqf, religious
endowments, 96 state credentialing of the clergy, and the
curriculum of religious schools cut into the ulama's
influence and power.97 In addition, the Shah barred public
Muharram processions and taziyeh.98 Nor was there any
special treatment for religious dissenters, as the
imprisonment and execution of Sayyed Hassan Modarres, a
leading religious figure who had been Reza's consistent
opponent, demonstrated. 99
92. Dabashi, supra note 71, at 504; MARTIN, supra note 21, at 9.
93. ARJOMAND, supra note 43, at 82.
94. Id. at 68, 215, tbl.9. Keddie says that "less than 10 percent of the
population received any elementary education, and, for secondary education,
the figure was under one percent." KEDDIE, supra note 8, at 99.
95. HALM, supra note 22, at 126-27.
96. ARJOMAND, supra note 43, at 82-83. According to Fischer, the
government's Office of Endowments was continually at odds with the clerical
establishment over management of vaqfs, or trusts, and the question of whether
the endowment of a trust could be converted out of the form in which it had
originally been made, whether the proceeds of the trust were limited to the
donor's specific purpose or could be used for broadly charitable purposes, and
whether the administrators of a particular endowment were entitled to the
position. Ten percent of trust income was claimed by the Office, which was
another source of controversy. Fischer, supra note 44, at 131-32.
97. Dabashi, supra note 71, at 505-06.
98. HALM, supra note 22, at 77.
99. Algar, supra note 58, at 740-41.
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Before Reza came to power in the first half of the
1920's, marriage and divorce were matters of private
contract adjudicated by religious figures. With Reza Shah,
the first of the two Pahlavi rulers, a modern bureaucratic
state started to form. Among his reforms was the creation
of a civil code that made important procedural changes in
the law of marriage and divorce.10 0 Religious scholars who
sat in judgment on marital issues now had to have state
credentials. Moreover, all marriages and divorces had to be
registered by the state. Subsequently, women seeking
divorce were required to bring their action in civil court,
diminishing the jurisdiction of the religious court and
limiting it to religious judgments on the validity of the
marriage or divorce.10 '
Reza Shah claimed to be a nationalist patriot, a
modernizer, and to model himself after Ataturk. After a
1934 visit to Turkey, where Kemal Ataturk had linked
progress, modernization, and dress, Reza Shah decreed that
women appearing in public could not be covered. His very
unpopular decree was known as kashf-e hejab, or
unveiling. 10 2 He directed the police force to uncover women
who wore chador-a head to toe cloak-in the streets and
informed employees that their jobs depended upon the
European dress of the female members of their families.
The unveiling order also provoked widespread civil unrest.
In 1935, a crowd of worshippers in Mashhad gathered at
the tomb of Imam Reza, the holiest shrine in Iran, 103 to
protest these policies. They refused to disperse and were
attacked. Casualties led to rioting which continued for a
100. Girls under thirteen could not marry; a wife could be granted a divorce
not only in cases of her husband's insanity or impotence, but also his
unwillingness to have sex, his affliction with a disease which could threaten her
health, or his mistreatment of her. Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Family Law in Modern
Persia, in ENCYCLOPEDIA IRANICA: VOLUME IX 192, 192 (Ehsan Yarshater ed.,
Bibliotheca Persia Press 1999) (1994).
101. Id.
102. Perhaps coincidentally, Khomeini's first attack on the Pahlavis as
enemies of Islam came in the early forties in an anonymously published book
called Kashf al-Asrar, The Unveiling of Secrets. ZUBAIDA, supra note 10, at 191.
In it, Khomeini wrote that "perhaps ... one day the slumbering people of Iran
will awaken so that you will get your just desserts." MARTIN, supra note 21, at
111.
103. Reza was the eighth Imam and the only one buried in Iran. HALM,
supra note 22, at 26.
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second day, until regular troops launched a machine-gun
attack that resulted in many deaths. 0 4 This served as both
a warning to the clergy and a source of future resentment
against the Pahlavis.105
2. Mohammad Reza Shah. Reza Shah's modernization
program, as well as vast oil deposits in the southeastern
provinces of Iran, made Iran part of the world economy.
Although he never succeeded in giving Iran an economic
base other than oil, that commodity was so important-first
to modern warfare, and then to everything else-that the
Iranian state became a great deal wealthier than it was
when he took power. It fell to his son, Mohammed Reza, to
try to make Iran something more than a source of oil, a
state richer and more powerful than its Arab counterparts,
Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In the early fifties, Prime Minister
Mohammad Mossadegh nationalized the oil industry, an
immensely popular move with Iranians, but a blow that
neither the British owners of Iranian oil, nor their
American allies, were prepared to absorb. 10 6 The British
stood to pay more for oil, while the Americans feared the
example of nationalist expropriation in a Cold War context,
particularly because the Iranian Communist Party, Tudeh,
or Masses, "was the most powerful, best organized party of
modern Iran.'10 7 and played a significant role in the newly-
active postwar Majles, now governed by the 1906
Constitution. Together in 1953, the Americans and the
British carried out a coup against Mossadegh and made the
104. Algar, supra note 58, at 743.
105. The unveiling policy was revoked in 1941 after the unpopular Reza
Shah was forced by the Allied powers to abdicate; the revocation was an
attempt to create popular support for his son, Mohammed Reza Shah, who then
assumed the throne. KEDDIE, supra note 8, at 105-06. Nonetheless, Ayatollah
Khomeini referenced the 1935 events in a speech in 1977 shortly before another
wave of religious protest lead to death at the hands of the Shah's forces in Qom.
Algar, supra note 58, at 743 n.42. After the Revolution of 1979, General Iraj
Matbu'i, whose troops had been involved in the 1935 deaths, was tried and
executed, although he was then in his eighties. Houchang Chahabi, Dress Codes
for Men in Turkey and Iran, in MEN OF ORDER: AUTHORITARIAN MODERNIZATION
UNDER ATATURK AND REZA SHAH 209, 230 (Touraj Atabaki & Erik-Jan Zurcher
eds., 2004).
106. See generally STEPHEN KINZER, ALL THE SHAH'S MEN: AN AMERICAN
COUP AND THE ROOTS OF MIDDLE EAST TERROR (2003).
107. AZADEH KIAN-THIEBAUT, supra note 75, at 103.
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Shah the effective head of government, kept in power by a
police force and army that developed virtually unlimited
access to American military assistance, but little popular
support. 108
Mohammad Reza, while not abandoning his father's
secularism, moved to placate the clergy by reversing some
of his father's anti-clerical legislation. He revoked the
unveiling order, 109 restoring the ulama's control of religious
endowments, and once again allowing the Muharram
processions that marked the anniversary of the death of
Hussein. 110 That strategy paid off when the only living
marja, Ayatollah Borujuerdi,111 begged the Shah to return
from Rome to take power when Mossadegh was deposed by
coup. Two others, Ayatollahs Behbehani 1 2 and Kashani,
the latter hitherto a supporter of Mossadegh, joined his
opponents at a critical moment. 1 3 In the coup, the ulama
"supported the preservation of the monarchy and the return
of the Shah as a safeguard against the spread of
communism."'1 4 Thereafter, the Shah and the ulama had
an "implicit concordat." 5 Thus, the decade after the anti-
Mossadegh coup was relatively stable, with opposition
108. See KINZER, supra note 106.
109. According to Halm, in 1948, the leading mujtahids issued a joint fatwa
requiring that the chador and the young Shah "did not dare oppose them."
HALM, supra note 22, at 127.
110. Id. at 78.
111. BASHIRIYEH supra note 69, at 63. Borujuerdi died in 1960, bringing the
need for a successor to the political forefront.
112. Behbehani was the son of Sayyed Abdallah Behbehani who had been a
strong supporter of the Constitutional Revolution and was himself a member of
a notable clerical family. ARJOMAND, supra note 43, at 81.
113. KIAN-THIEBAUT, supra note 75, at 102.
114. ARJOMAND, supra note 43, at 85. According to the CIA history of the
coup, as reported by the New York Times, part of the agency's anti-Mossadegh
strategy was to stir up distrust among clerics of Communist influence with
Mossadegh. To this end, the house of a prominent Muslim (presumably a cleric)
was bombed and threats were made against other clerics in the name of the
Tudeh party. James Risen, How a Plot Convulsed Iran in '53 (and in '79), N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 16, 2000, at 1, 14.
115. MARTIN, supra note 21, at 19.
2007] 1159
BUFFALO LAW REIEW
muted and "oil income and American economic aid
resumed."1 1 6
The relationship between the regime and the ulama
became more attenuated as the Shah attempted to do what
was ultimately impossible-keep an iron grip on the state
and the economy and yet make sufficient changes to mollify
Iranians opposed to the authoritarian nature of the regime
and the uneven development it sponsored. Reform was
urged by several United States administrations, beginning
with Eisenhower. The Shah, whose "survival had been
chiefly due to American support,"'117 was in no position to
refuse. Under pressure from the Americans, as well as a
recession, the Shah moved to co-opt potential adversaries
and turn them into supporters," 8 launching Inqilab-i Safid,
the so-called "White Revolution."'" 9
The White Revolution, which began in 1961, was an
attempt to create a popular base for the Shah among those
sections of society that had hitherto been relatively inactive
in political life and whose entry, by sponsoring, he hoped to
turn to his own account. He looked to peasants, sponsoring
a land reform program designed to force compensated
transfers120 from large landowners to those who worked the
land. Though far from feminist himself,121 in seeking new
bases for political support, the Shah turned also to women,
creating some space for them. The White Revolution aimed
to bring women into the political process as Shah
supporters, by making education more available to them, as
well as jobs in the state bureaucracy. They were to be a new
116. JOHN FORAN, FRAGILE RESISTANCE: SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN IRAN
FROM 1500 TO THE REVOLUTION 317 (1993).
117. Hambly, supra note 78, at 279.
118. BASHIRIYEH, supra note 69, at 20-21.
119. This appellation was the regime's way of creating an identity for the
Shah's reform different from those proposed by "black and red reactionaries,"
Keddie, supra note 8, at 145, or clerics and Communists. The plan was also
known as the "Revolution of the Shah and the People," and as Arjomand points
out slyly, it "set in motion a revolution of the Shah and the people. However,
there was a sharp disjunction in the latter revolution." ARJOMAND, supra note
43, at 73.
120. BASHIRIYEH, supra note 69, at 21.
121. Id. at 22.
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class of political actors, loyal to the Shah from the initiation
of their political agency.
This plan for the White Revolution was submitted to
the electorate (including women voters for the first time in
a national election 22) in a 1963 referendum also designed
to demonstrate support. 123 But opposition did exist. As
Gavin Hambly says, "[i]n view ... of the government's claim
that the result [of the referendum] was a vote of confidence
in the Shah's policies, it was embarrassing that massive
anti-plebiscite demonstrations and riots took place."'1 24 The
opposition came from a new source, 125 the previously
obscure 126 sixty-two year old Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
It was the White Revolution that first evoked the fateful
and "implacable opposition"' 27 of an adversary with a
"vibrant and powerful vision of Islam .. .coupled with the
ability to transmit it, imperiously and convincingly, to
others."128
Khomeini came to prominence after the death of
Ayatollah Borujuerdi in 1961; like Boujuerdi, Khomeini
eventually became recognized as a marja. Until
Borujuerdi's death, Khomeini, his prot6g6, emulated him in
remaining "politically rather quietist.' ' 29  But after
Borujuerdi's death, it did not take Khomeini long to make
known his opposition to the Shah's government, leading
first to exile and ultimately to victory.
122. PARVIN PAIDAR, WOMEN AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY IRAN 145 (1995).
123. At the same time, funding for SAVAK, the Shah's hated secret police,
was increased to take on opposition that could not be won over. ARJOMAND,
supra note 43, at 73-74.
124. Hambly, supra note 78, at 279.
125. MOADDEL, supra note 85, at 139.
126. See generally MAHRAN KAMRAVA, REVOLUTION IN IRAN: THE ROOTS OF
TURMOIL (1990).
127. FORAN, supra note 116, at 336. The reasons for Khomeini's opposition
to the White Revolution are not clear. Khomeini objected not only to female
suffrage, but to extraterritoriality for Americans accused of committing crimes
in Iran, as well as to nationalization of some of the assets of the ulama. MARTIN,
supra note 21, at 22.
128. Algar, supra note 58, at 751.
129. KEDDIE, supra note 8, at 147.
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D. Khomeini and His Changing View of Religious Authority
The general American view of post-revolutionary Iran
begins (and often ends) with Ayatollah Khomeini, whose
stern visage is usually at the forefront of the actual
photographs, and certainly the mental images, that conjure
up the Iranian Revolution, the hostage crisis, the Iran-Iraq
war, and the general notion of a fundamentalist religious
state. Yet, as Ervand Abrahamian pointed out more than
twenty years ago, Khomeini was far from a religious
fundamentalist. 130 By the end of his life, he was a
pragmatic politician who not only recognized, but accepted,
the extent to which religious norms and practices might
have to give way to the exigencies of governance.
Abrahamian suggests a variety of ways in which
Khomeini, once in power, proved himself to be something
other than a fundamentalist. For one thing, he did not
reject the modern nation-state's claim to the affiliation of
believers, but was actually an Iranian patriot. Nor did he
insist upon an Islamic Republic that duplicated Islam's
early governance of believers, instead backing a
constitution "modeled less on the early caliphate than on de
Gaulle's Fifth Republic," 131 and containing a judiciary
overseen by the state, rather than operating outside it. His
Islamic ideology was distinctly political: in the
revolutionary period he "hammered away at the [Shah's]
regime on its most visible, political, social, and economic
shortcomings."132  Indeed, it was precisely those
shortcomings that he denounced as un-Islamic. Finally,
Khomeini's construction of an Islamic Republic was novel
and departed from Shi'i tradition that had not sought
political involvement of religious jurists in the governance
of the state. Even within Iran, as Dahlen also points out,
Khomeini "met with criticism from other traditionalist
ulama who opposed any appropriation of or dialogue with
modernity whatsoever and wanted to preserve the
traditional dualism of religious and political power." 133 It
was precisely here, however, that Khomeini emerged as an
130. ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN, KHOMEINISM 15 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1983).
131. Id. at 15.
132. Id. at 17.
133. Dahlen, supra note 11, at 115 n.17.
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innovator, by his arguments for both religion and
republicanism.
Thus, in the revolutionary period, Khomeini came to
embody both the desire for a democratic constitution and
Shi'ism's "sense of insurrectionary expectation."'13 4 Indeed,
it is said that when Khomeini declared his opposition to the
Shah in 1963, he held a Qu'ran in one hand and the 1906
constitution in the other and accused the Shah of
abandoning both.135
On June 5, 1963, a day that marked the climax of the
annual commemoration of an event fundamental to
Shi'ism-the martyrdom of Imam Hossein, the Prophet's
grandson-Khomeini described the Shah's government as
"fundamentally opposed to Islam"'136  and explicitly
compared the Shah to those who martyred Hossein. That
defiance led to his arrest two days later, sparking riots
throughout Iran, in which thousands were killed when the
army fired on crowds in Tehran, Qum, Shiraz, Isfahan, and
Mashhad, leading to the imposition of martial law. 13 7 As
Kian-Thiebaut says, "the religious orientation and
leadership of the [1979] revolution originated in the
ferocious repression of the June 1963 uprisings."' 38 For the
first time, a religious movement was at the head of the
opposition to the Shah. 39 Khomeini was sent into exile but
he remained the people's leader.
By the seventies, the Pahlavi dynasty was "increasing
perceived as pursuing the interests of its own elite and of a
134. Dabashi, supra note 71, at 482. But cf. Keddie, supra note 38. In times
of defeat or persecution, adherence to the Hidden Imam may also have the
effect of accustoming believers "to an indefinite wait for the mahdi" and hence
to passivity in the face of injustice. Id. at 89.
135. ARJOMAND, supra note 43, at 85.
136. Algar, supra note 58, at 753.
137. MARTIN, supra note 21, at 63. Iranian sources claim "not less than
15,000" died in the protests against the arrest. THE POSITION OF WOMEN FROM
THE VIEWPOINT OF IMAM KHOMEINI 60 n.77 (Juliana Shaw & Behrooz Arezoo
trans., 2001) [hereinafter KHOMEINI].
138. KIAN-THIEBAUT, supra note 75, at 224. Khomeini was arrested and
jailed for ten months and then released. Six months later, he gave another
objectionable speech decrying the Shah's relationship with the U.S.; he was
then sent into exile from which he did not return until February 1979, after the
Shah fled Iran.
139. ARJOMAND, supra note 43, at 87
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foreign power [the United States] while operating an
oppressive political system and neglecting the poor."'140 The
mobilization of Iranian society in opposition to the Shah
was broad enough to encompass virtually every ideology
that existed in the Iran of that day: secularists, left, liberal
and moderate; islamists from reddest red to greenest green;
atheist and agnostic; communist, nationalist, tribalist;
feminist and anti-feminist; workers, blue-collar and white-
collar; peasants and petty bureaucrats; bazaaris and
intellectuals-the anti-Shah movement was as inclusive a
coalition as imaginable. 141
Inevitably, the differences that melted in the heat of
revolution crystallized again when the question was no
longer ousting the monarchy, but replacing it. In particular,
a violent ultra-left opposition quickly arose, at the same
time that right-wing opponents continued their attempts to
bring down the new government. 142 The tremendous
prestige of Ayatollah Khomeini as both leader and symbol
of opposition carried over to popular support for the
constitution of an Islamic Republic. 143 But even Khomeini
could not determine alone how Iran was to be governed.
Thus, the post-revolutionary form of the Islamic state
was itself a compromise. Secularists wanted a republic, but
what did Khomeini's forces want? Khomeini, from the exile
to which he had been ordered in 1964, had written and
lectured about the flaws and defects of the monarchy,
indeed of all monarchies. But, despite his earlier support for
the 1906 constitution, by 1970, Khomeini was clear that the
scope of representative government must also be limited:
"[I]n Islam the legislative power and competence to
establish laws belongs exclusively to God Almighty. The
sacred Legislator of Islam is the sole legislative power. No
one has the right to legislate and no law may be executed
except the ... ruling of the [Divine] Legislator."' 44
140. MARTIN, supra note 21, at 47.
141. ASGHAR SCHIRAZI, THE CONSTITUTION OF IRAN: POLITICS AND THE STATE
IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 1 (John O'Kane trans., 1997).
142. MARTIN, supra note 21, at 169-70.
143. Id. at 152-53.
144. Khomeini, Velayat-i faqih, quoted in DAHLEN, supra note 11, at 116.
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In a series of lectures about Islamic government
delivered during his exile in Iraq in the seventies, Khomeini
made the novel claim that religious jurists not only could,
but should, govern a nation of believers through velayat-e
faqih, the guardianship of the jurist.145 Although the term,
in modern times, referenced the religious jurist's duty and
ability to protect those unable to care for themselves-
minors, the disabled, women with no male relations-in the
revolutionary context, it came to be used as a means to
extend the relationship between believers and religious
leaders to the political realm.
Khomeini based his claim in part upon the authority of
marji'yat. There was a tradition of respect for a marja and
widespread deference to his fatwas, or religio-legal
rulings.146 Khomeini, himself a marja,147 extended this
deference to the political realm, arguing that in the absence
of the just government of the Imam, the descendant of the
Prophet, whose reappearance would establish perfect
justice on earth, a marja should be understood to "have the
'same authority' as the Prophet and imams; . . . and
jurisdiction over believers ...."148
From that point of view, it was logical to insist upon the
rule of the jurist who could best understand the divine law.
But by the time the Shah's government had been ousted in
early 1979, the popular demand for a republic was
unquenchable. Because the political situation required it,
Khomeini did in fact accept a republican legislature, the
Majles, made up of elected representatives, as well as a
president elected by the people, but in tandem with the
guardianship of the jurist. The Islamic Republic thus had a
modern president and parliament with an entirely novel
religious leadership atop it. Dahlen, in an interesting
145. ABRAHAMIAN, supra note 130, at 24.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
147. At the time of the Iranian revolution, Khomeini was one of several
recognized marja. There was some objection among them to Khomeini's
formulation of the means by which the IRI was to be governed. MIR-HOSSEINI,
supra note 64, at 15. The association of velayat-i faqih with the marjiyat
suggested that believers were no longer free to choose their own marja but must
adhere to the velayat-i faqih. Ayatollahs Khoe'i and Shariat-Madari, in
particular, made their objections to this known. DAHLEN, supra note 11, at 115
n.17.
148. ABRAHAMIAN, supra note 130, at 25.
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discussion of Khomeini, concludes, "By considering the
intellectual as well as practical question of modernity as
essentially political, [Khomeini] accepted many modern
notions (i.e. institutions), while rejecting the values and
ideas of modernity .... Khomeini's attempt was essentially
one of appropriating the notion of the modern state to
Islam."149
The revolutionary government that came to replace the
monarchy was in effect a combination of the secularists'
constitutional republic and Khomeini's velayat-e faqih,
literally creating the Islamic Republic of Iran. It had a
popularly elected president and parliament. It also had an
appointed Supreme Religious Jurist (inevitably, and for his
lifetime, Khomeini) with the authority to dismiss the
president, appoint military commanders, declare war and
name clerics 150  to a Guardian Council, Shureh-ye
Negahban, that, in an echo of the 1906 constitution,
reviewed legislation for its compatibility with Islam.
Once in power, Khomeini revealed himself as pragmatic
in respect to governance by shari'a. Obviously, the new
power relations of the post-revolutionary moment made the
adoption of shari'a as the law of the state problematic.
Khomeini did not insist on the jurisprudence of shari'a that
had been protected during the Pahlavi dynast by an ulama
jealous of its jurisdiction, particularly in respect to the law
of marriage and family. Instead, Khomeini now said it was
a "fact" that the jurisprudence of shari'a "is dynamic and
that zaman wa makan (time and place) are . . . decisive
elements" in it.151 Feqh-e puya, or dynamic feqh, is "the
practical implementation of the eternal shari'a [to]
changing human conditions,"152 a kind of pragmatism, not
in respect to the word of God, but in respect to its
contextual implementation.
149. DAHLEN, supra note 11, at 115.
150. HALM, supra note 22, at 147.
151. DAHLEN, supra note 11, at 117 (quoting Khomeini). The jurisprudence
of time and place asserts that "while the Quran is the word of God, God spoke to
people in terms they could understand, which makes the utterances relative to
the milieu of their reception." ZUBAIDA, supra note 10, at 222.
152. DAHLEN, supra note 11, at 117.
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Indeed, it might be accurate to say that feqh, the
jurisprudence of the revealed law, 153  was now
problematized, in the sense that its meanings had to be
rethought and shari'a itself recontextualized. Shari'a is
understood to be a law for all times and all places and
hence must suit each time and place. Thus, Khomeini's
approach suggested (though never explicitly) that feqh may
be socially and historically contingent. While in theory that
process is never alien to Islamic jurisprudence, in practice
such a large-scale recontextualization as that demanded by
the creation of an Islamic republic, with a constitution
recognizing the sovereignty of God and of the people, 154 was
unique. As Ziba Mir-Hosseini writes, what was at stake was
no less than "the transformation of Shi'a jurisprudence ...
from a scholarly discipline whose relevance was confined to
the seminaries, into the ideology of the state backed by a
modern [state] apparatus."'155
Pragmatism was not new to Khomeini. He had, for
example, first made public his opposition to the Shah on the
issue of female suffrage, 156 which he denounced as "contrary
to Islam and the Constitution."'' 57 Yet returning to Iran
after the fall of the Shah's government, when power was
still in the streets, Khomeini told women that they "must
participate in the fundamental matters of the country ... in
the same way that men are involved in all matters."'5 8 His
153. Feqh is the "human effort of giving a specific... norm or ruling.., on
a particular human act by studying the relevant textual sources and
investigating its proper context .... [It] is not the 'end product' of legal learning
or law itself, but rather an 'open texture' as the process of understanding and
inference, open to rational argumentation and the historical process." Id. at 40-
42. A faqih (pl. fuqaha) is one who does such jurisprudence. Because
jurisprudence as a "process of intellectual activity [is] an act of piety, which
discovers the terms of the Divine Will," the faqih is more than a judge, but less
than a legislator. Id. at 46.
154. "Absolute sovereignty over the world and man belongs to God and it is
He Who has made man master of his social destiny . . . .The people are to
exercise this divine right in the manner specified in the following articles."
CONSTITUTION, supra note 27, art. 56.
155. Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Ayatollah Khomeini and the Question of Women:
Pre- and Post-Revolutionary Positions, in AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND THE
MODERNIZATION OF ISLAMIc LEGAL THOUGHT 28 (Richard Tapper ed., 2000).
156. See MARTIN, supra note 21, at 60.
157. PAIDAR, supra note 122, at 142.
158. Mir-Hosseini, supra note 155, at 29 (quoting Khomeini).
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previous opposition had been, not to women voting, but to
their voting in the corrupt Shah's elections.159
Unsurprisingly, women were considered more likely to vote
for Islamist candidates, than their left secular co-
revolutionaries, who made up the other substantial block of
candidates. And indeed this expectation was fulfilled, with
women lending "massive support ... to the revolution and
its aftermath."'160
By the end of his life, Abrahamian says, Khomeini "was
now close to concluding that the affairs of this world were
separate from the understanding of the sacred law.' '16 1 It
was clear to Khomeini that his own guardianship was such
that the Islamic Republic was in good hands. But as he
tired, and recognized the temporal limits of his role, he took
a number of steps designed to ensure that the republic
would continue in the course he had set. For one thing, he
modified the qualifications necessary for his successor as
Supreme Religious Jurist so that they did not include
reaching marjiyat, the highest level of religious esteem. He
said that the person who replaced him need not necessarily
be a marja, but rather should be the religious jurist "most
knowledgeable about the contemporary world, especially
economic, social, and political matters."'162
Inevitably, religious, social, and political elements
would not always remain in tandem. There were serious
differences between the Majles and the Guardian Council
over attempts to provide benefits to the working poor, both
urban and agricultural. Redistributive moves by the Majles
were opposed by the Guardian Council, united in its
adherence to the almost unequivocal protection afforded
property by shari'a. In particular, land reform, labor
protection, and state control of foreign trade became major
political issues. Early in 1988, Khomeini wrote a letter to
Ali Khamenei (then President, today Supreme Religious
Jurist), in which he announced his opinion that ensuring
the continued existence of the Islamic Republic of Iran took
"precedence over all other [religiously-] derived ordinances,
159. See id. at 31-32.
160. Roksana Bahramitash, Revolution, Islamization and Women's
Employment in Iran, 9 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 229, 230 (2003).
161. ABRAHAMIAN, supra note 130, at 35.
162. Id. at 35.
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such as prayer, fasting and the pilgrimage" and that this
was the responsibility of the Supreme Jurist.163
Since prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage are fundamental
pillars of Islam, Khomeini's declaration was stunning. The
view of Iran's Supreme Jurist was that the interests of the
Islamic state were more central to Islam than its
prescriptions. Khomeini's letter made complete the
identification of Islam with the interests of the IRI, and the
subordination of prescriptive law to each. As Sami Zubaida
writes:
This was a clear.., empowerment of the state freely to pursue its
legislation and policy-making in the belief that the Muslim ruler
as an ordinance of God stands above all other divine ordinances,
and could abrogate even the most basic of rules if it was judged to
be in the interest of the Muslim people and their state. 164
Vanessa Martin puts Khomeini's 1988 declaration,
known as velayat-i mutlaqa-yi faqih, the absolute powers of
the Supreme Religious Jurist, into the context of the
religious commitments of Khomeini, 165 who was a well-
known teacher of 'irfan,166 a form of esoteric knowledge that
combines "Sufi thought and Twelver Shi'ite philosophy."'167
Irfan conceives of the possibility of human union with the
divine, in the person of the Mahdi, from which "the perfect
man will return to the larger community with a
combination of knowledge of the transcendent and an
understanding of... effective thought and action in service
of the community.' 168  If an 'arif, one who acquires
"enlightened inner awareness of the transcendent"'' 69
through 'irfan is "imbued with the same divine wisdom as
163. ZUBAIDA, supra note 10, at 210.
164. Id. In Zubaida's view, the consequence is that the Islamic Republic of
Iran is not in fact an Islamic state. Sami Zubaida, Is Iran an Islamic State?, in
POLITICAL ISLAM: ESSAYS FROM THE MIDDLE EAST REPORT 102, 118 (Joel Beinin &
Joe Stork eds., 1997).
165. See MARTIN, supra note 21, at 41.
166. DAHLEN, supra note 11, at 114 n.15. The term irfan is often translated
as "theosophy." Id. at 39 n.1.
167. Id. at 63 n.26. (quoting GERHARD BOWERING, THE MYSTICAL VISION OF
EXISTENCE IN CLASSICAL ISLAM 551 (1998)).
168. MARTIN, supra note 21, at 35.
169. Id. at 35.
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the shari'a, he may be justified in altering it in particular
circumstances as the ruling jurist."1 70 Such alteration is not
the contradiction of shari'a, for 'irfan and shari'a are "two
manifestations of the same truth,"1 71 one inward and one
outward. It appears that Khomeini saw the Islamic republic
as existing even beyond the law as a manifestation of divine
truth.
Whatever the religious basis for Khomeini's startling
decision that the interests of the IRI trumped religious law,
it led to the creation of an institutional body empowered to
discern when the interests of the Islamic Republic might
require suspension of prescriptive law.1 72 This was the
Shureh-ye Maslahat-i Nizam, Council for Assessing the
Interests of the Regime, known as the Expediency Council,
which could step in to resolve disputes between the Majles
and the Guardian Council. 173 In that resolution, the
Expediency Council was to ascertain the interests of the
state and to consider them paramount, as a matter of
religious duty.1 74
This is the paradox of the Islamic Republic. On the one
hand, the unity of state and religion is now clear, as "the
Shi'a state has joined the Sunni one in being legitimate in
theory as well as practice."' 75 Despite centuries of Shi'a
disdain for the rule of any earthly power and the conviction
that only the Hidden Imam could bring divine governance
to the world, the only state governed by Shi'is and
administered under their law came to regard itself as
legitimate and Islamic, just as Sunni states did. But on the
other hand, that state came to be read, by its founder, its
revered leader, its most central figure, as beyond the law
170. Id. at 41.
171. Id. at 40. Indeed, the prescriptions of the law "are understood not only
as norms of behaviour, but also as objects of contemplation, which lead toward
the perception and the love of God." DAHLEN, supra note 11, at 51.
172. This body was subsequently constitutionalized as Article 112 in the
1989 Amendments to the Iranian Constitution. See generally ANOUSHIRARVAN
EHTESHAMI, AFTER KHOMEINI: THE IRANIAN SECOND REPUBLIC 41 (1995).
173. The Expediency Council includes the Guardian Council, but it is in the
minority; the majority of members are nominated by the president and the
Majles, the elected branches of government. ZUBAIDA, supra note 10, at 21.
174. The Expediency Council was subsequently constitutionalized as Article
112 by 1989 amendment. EHTESHAMI, supra note 172, at 38.
175. MARTIN, supra note 21, at 172.
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itself. This paradox of authority was particularly important
for the law most relevant to women, the law of marriage
and divorce.
III. WOMEN, AUTHORITY AND SHARIA IN THE IRI
A. Women in Iran Before and After the Revolution
The "Woman Question," the issue of their place in a
modern society and a developing economy, and, in
particular, of their suffrage, had certainly been in politics in
the period before the Revolution, but women themselves
were not, by and large, political actors. The Shah, seeking
new sectors of support in the early sixties, had tried to
mobilize them. Female suffrage, though an important
breakthrough for women, was a political concession that,
because of the Shah's limitations on political activity, was
nonetheless more symbolic than real, even before 1975
when the Shah made Iran a one-party state. 176 Even in the
sixties, the two legal parties were not in any real sense
allowed to be oppositional, either to each other or to the
Shah.
More important to women's everyday life was the 1967
Family Protection Law. With that measure, initiation of
divorce became available to women as well as to men and
any divorce had to be registered by the state, rather than
simply taking place in the form of talaq, the husband's oral
renunciation of the wife. The husband's polygamy rights
were limited and made dependent upon the first wife's
consent and the court's permission. 177 A further 1975
amendment to the law allowed courts discretion in granting
custody or support in consequence of divorce. These
changes, which in effect created a rough gender equality in
the law of divorce and custody, were not accomplished by
renouncing shari'a as a basis for family law. Rather
176. The Rastakhiz-i-Milli, or National Resurgence, was created in 1975.
FORAN, supra note 116, at 315. The two previously legal parties, Hizb-I
Mardum, the People's Party, and Hizb-I Iran-I Novin, the New Iran Party, had
both been puppets of the Shah. See Hambly, supra note 78, at 283. These two
were "Tweedledum and Tweedledee in the art of obsequiousness." Id. at 289.
177. Behnaz Pakizegi, Legal and Social Positions of Iranian Women, in
WOMEN IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 221 (Lois Beck & Nikki Keddie eds., 1978).
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procedural changes were made, generally in the form of
modifications to the standard marriage contract, itself a
religiously-prescribed document. 178 Indeed "clerics were
consulted . . . to give . . . religious legitimacy."'179
Nonetheless, the FPL was, upon its 1967 passage,
denounced by Khomeini as intending "the destruction of the
Muslim family unit, . . . [and] contrary to the ordinances of
Islam."180
But even with the FPL, the legal position of women
changed more than their social position,' 8 ' which in spite of
the claims "widely believed and repeated in the Western
media . . . was not being revolutionised for the better as a
result of state policies."'1 2  Land reform and rural
emigration had turned many farm families into wage
laborers and "destroyed women's productive role" within
the family economy.18 3 While many became carpet weavers,
this was work that was low-paid, or not paid at all. 8 4 As
agricultural laborers, women's wages were half those of
men.18 5 Urban women who worked were also paid less than
men; unlike rural women, their rate of labor force
participation declined in the sixties, though it rose again in
the seventies.18 6
While education was legally mandatory for both boys
and girls, it was hardly available to anyone in rural areas,
though in towns both boys and girls had a roughly equal
chance at an elementary education. 8 7 Educated upper-
middle class women also had new access to education and
178. See Mir-Hosseini, supra note 100, at 193. The 1975 amendment also
raised the legal age of marriage to eighteen for girls. Pakizegi, supra note 177,
at 219.
179. Elham Gheytanchi, Civil Society in Iran: Politics of Motherhood and
the Public Sphere, 16 INT'L Soc. 557, 568 (2001).
180. Mir-Hosseini, supra note 100, at 32.
181. Pakizegi, supra note 177, at 217. Even in that regard, it did not meet
the demands of the official women's movement. PAIDAR, supra note 122, at 159.
182. PAIDAR, supra note 122, at 160.
183. Id. at 160-61.
184. Id. at 161.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 164.
187. See generally id. at 312-18.
[Vol. 541172
LAW, AUTHORITY, AND GENDER
professional careers, and their new jobs as teachers, nurses
and office workers contributed to an increase in women
working in the formal economy 88 from around 18% of the
female population to around 20% between 1960 and 1980.189
But some of these women were also absorbed into the
Western image that "constructed [them] as sex-objects,"'190
contrary to the premium placed on female modesty in the
Islamic tradition.
All this meant that women were not uniformly
supporters of the Shah's reforms in their favor, so that
when, in the seventies, economic conditions declined for
many people, he could not count upon their support. As
Roksana Bahramitash says, "For the majority of women
who lived in rural areas, and for the working class and poor
urban dwellers, the gains for women that resulted from the
Shah's reforms were marginal."'19 In fact, it was not the
Shah, but the anti-Shah coalition that had succeeded in
mobilizing women, including women from the working class
and the peasantry who had hitherto been politically
powerless. 192 It was precisely these women of the popular
classes whose solidarity in opposition to the Shah were to
be crucial in his overthrow and whose loyalty Khomeini
sought throughout the revolutionary period. They were
devout and their support went overwhelmingly to
Khomeini, who actually encouraged their unprecedented
political participation in an interview just as the
188. A great deal of women's labor in Iran, such as textile and agricultural
work, is unpaid work within the family unit. MARYAM POYA, WOMEN, WORK &
ISLAMISM: IDEOLOGY & RESISTANCE IN IRAN 22-23 (1999). Nonetheless, much of
this work is crucial to the formal economy, e.g., carpet-weaving, which is, after
oil, Iran's second largest export.
189. Roksana Bahramitash, Islamic Fundamentalism and Women's
Economic Role: The Case of Iran, 16 INT'L. J. POL. CULTURE & SOC'Y 551, 556
(2003) (citing World Bank World Development Indicator 2001). Interestingly,
the gain in the next twenty years is much larger: from 20% to around 26%. Id.
Bahramitash says, "This runs counter to the common stereotypical assumption
associating the rise of political Islam . . . with a decrease in paid employment
for women." Id. at 564.
190. PAIDAR, supra note 122, at 166.
191. Bahramitash, supra note 189, at 231.
192. See PAIDAR, supra note 122, at 303-05. In this, the second Iranian




revolutionary conflict reached its height. 193 Nor did his
earlier opposition to female suffrage survive the demise of
the Shah: within a month of his return to Iran in February
1979, he was calling on women to vote in the referendum
establishing an Islamic republic. 194
Thus, in the struggle over power that immediately
replaced the anti-Shah struggle, women's support was both
crucial and available to the supporters of the Islamic
Republic and its constitution of shari'a. Consequently, the
birth of the Islamic Republic took place in a gender context
at odds with that figured in the post-Medinan 195 past where
women had been largely absent from public life. Now
Iranian women's political agency had been solicited and
they were for the first time massively active in political
events. 196 Moreover, this was occurring in a revolutionary
context, where a claim of many revolutionaries was that the
Prophetic message had been one of social justice. 197 That
social justice had not existed since the days of the Prophetic
and Imamic leadership, but under the divine law it could
exist again, they pledged. Such a promise would be hard to
redeem, but harder still to revoke. Indeed, Khomeini
himself had promised women that an Islamic state would
mean justice and equality for them, "Islam has never
disagreed with [women's] freedom; on the contrary, Islam
disagreed with the concept of the commodified woman, and
opposed their commodification and returned their dignity
and honour to them. Woman is equal to man; like men, they
are free to choose their destiny and their activities."'198
In regard to women, revolutionary success thus posed
the very interesting question: what did the revolutionary
understanding of the social justice and equality
193. Speech of Dec. 7, 1978, KHOMEINI, supra note 137, at 55.
194. Speech of March 8, 1979, Id. at 62.
195. On the search for the "golden age" of gender equality, see Qudzia
Mirza, Islamic Feminism and the Exemplary Past, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON
LAW & THEORY 187 (Janice Richardson & Ralph Sandland eds., 2000).
196. While patriotic women were supporters of the Constitutional
Revolution of 1905-11, their support was rejected by most of its active male
participants. See PAIDAR, supra note 122, at 60-67.
197. See, e.g., ALI RAHNEMA, AN ISLAMIC UTOPIAN: A BIOGRAPHY OF ALI
SHARI'ATI (1998).
198. Mir-Hosseini, supra note 100, at 30 (quoting Khomeini).
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commitments of revelation mean for the law that would
apply to a group that had previously been voiceless, but
whose voices had been summoned precisely in response to
the appeal to those commitments?
From the first days of the IRI, the application of shari'a
to women could not be contained within the forms it had
assumed in a society where women had yet to claim a place
in public life. Certainly such constraint was contemplated
with the declaration that the FPL was un-Islamic and
would be replaced by religious law; with the attempt to
lessen women's economic participation in the workforce,
with the removal of women from certain positions of
authority, including the judiciary; with the closing of some
areas of work and study to women; with sexual segregation
of public spaces; with reinstatement of a criminal code that
assigned different penalties for violence against men and
women; and, most notoriously in the West, with the
requirement of hejab, or head covering, for women in
public. 199
But each of these constraints came under attack; most
failed to be fully instituted and some have disappeared
entirely. Interestingly, it is in respect to hejab that there
has been most success in imposing an historically-approved
condition upon women, no doubt because most women of
the popular classes already wore hejab and also because of
the peculiar political and social history of gender covering
during the Pahlavi dynasty. 200 And of course, hejab is the
most purely symbolic of impositions on women and the least
likely to impact directly on their social condition in respect
to education, reproductive life, and political and workforce
participation.
In the legal issues of most interest to women, those
relating to marriage, family, and to economic participation,
women in large part avoided or modified impositions that
would have most constrained their lives and families.
Restrictions on women in the workforce have been repealed
and measures like daycare in large-scale enterprises
mandated. Women's education has proceeded apace and
199. Halper, supra note 2, at 106.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
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extended far beyond what existed in the Shah's time. 201
This pragmatism has become as characteristic of the IRI's
gender legislation as has the steadfast insistence upon
hejab that, in the American view, defines the IRI's gender
policies.
B. Women and Shari'a
After the revolution, the economy slid. American
sanctions had their impact almost immediately with the
hostage crisis that began in November 1979; the ensuing
war with Iraq substantially reduced income from oil
exports. While not explicitly socialist, the revolutionary
coalition confiscated the local wealth of emigres and, in
response to these conditions, directed bonyads, quasi-public
religious foundations, to use it for the benefit of the poor.
Women were major beneficiaries, as expropriated wealth
went into large-scale programs to bring literacy and health
care to Khomeini's poorest supporters. 202 Women were the
working core of this program as well, as unpaid volunteers
and organizers. It was in this way that the working lives of
many women began, and then continued when the war
required their mobilization as first aid workers, drivers and
mechanics, and providers of food and clothing to troops.
These endeavors took on new depth during wartime
suffering when the social safety net became crucial to the
continuation of day-to-day life for millions of poor families.
At the same time, enforced gender segregation in teaching
and health care, inter alia, created a need for more women
in those professions. Thus, even while the new regime
explicitly claimed that the innate destiny of women was
motherhood and work outside the home was at best
secondary, in practice it did very little to keep women at
home. Some professions were closed to them (e.g., the
judiciary, mining, and some kinds of engineering), but in
actuality women were strongly encouraged by Ayatollah
Khomeini to continue their volunteer efforts outside the
201. See Halper, supra note 2, at 90.
202. Khomeini said literacy was a religious duty for women, so opposition
from husbands or fathers was rare. See Bahramitash supra, note 189, at 561.
Literacy and educational opportunity obviously contribute to a rising
employment rate for women. See id. at 565.
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home, 20 3 and support for working women in the form of
state-mandated daycare at large workplaces was
legislated. 204
Two key elements then in the post-revolutionary
situation were, first, the initial, ongoing and politically
significant support of women of the popular classes for
Islamist forces 205 and, second, the Islamist government's
need for their enhanced participation in economic and
political life, both as volunteers and employees. 206 The
consequence was that, from the new government's point of
view, the attitude of these women toward the law that
governed their marriages and their families was not
insignificant. On the other hand, a profound conviction of
the government and its leadership was that the previous
regime's legal views on women were dangerous to the
nation and had to be replaced by religious law.
Within two weeks of Khomeini's triumphant return to
Iran after the fall of the Shah, it was announced by his
office that the FPL was "un-Islamic" and would be replaced
by shari'a.207 The FPL courts quickly disappeared, replaced
in September 1979 by special courts headed by religious
figures. 208 But the religious law that would replace the FPL
would give men unilateral power to divorce, require no
payment of alimony to the divorced wife, and give the wife
custody of her children only in their infancy. Her only
financial compensation would be in the form of the mahr,
the marriage gift,209 in the sum named in the original
contract, an amount whose value was likely to have been
much diminished by inflation. Her own grounds for
initiating divorce would be extremely limited. Moreover,
her husband could enter into three more marriage contracts
at the same time without her consent. If her husband died,
203. See POYA, supra note 188, at 65.
204. Id. at 115.
205. PAIDAR, supra note 122 at 207-12.
206. POYA, supra note 188, at 94-98.
207. Halper, supra note 2, at 87-88.
208. Nobelist Shirin Ebadi was among the female civil judges ousted from
the divorce court. SHIRIN EBADI & AZADEH MOAVENI, IRAN AWAKENING: A
MEMOIR OF REVOLUTION AND HOPE (2006).
209. The marriage gift, or mahr, is the initial consideration paid by the
husband in return for the wife's entrance into the marriage contract.
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his male relatives were her children's guardian, not their
mother. Moreover, all of these measures would be enforced
in religious courts in which women could not serve as
judges. Women could hardly be expected to give whole-
hearted support to these retrograde policies.
In fact, women's unhappiness with the new legal
regime's lack of congruence with their domestic lives, and
their complaints and resistance, led to amelioration of the
law's consequences through procedural modifications.
Among the changes they achieved were limitations on the
husband's power of unilateral divorce, now subject to the
consent of the court to be granted after the matter was
referred to mediation; expansion of the grounds on and
means by which they could initiate divorce themselves;
expanded rights to child custody, and additional forms of
compensation upon divorce, including up to half the
earnings of the marriage as well as wages for unpaid home
labor undertaken during the course of the marriage. 210 In
sum, these changes amounted not simply to a return to the
substance of the FPL, but went beyond it in respect to
protecting the position of women either threatened by, or
wishing to obtain, a divorce. 211
Women clearly played the major role in obtaining these
changes, but nonetheless, they were contending with a legal
regime that had traditionally been interpreted in ways that
limited women and rejected their equality claims. Thus, it
is worthwhile to consider how it was that that law could
now respond to their claims. Examining two particular
changes in the law may be helpful in this respect. Each of
these changes took place after Khomeini's death in 1989
and before the 1997 presidential election of Mohammad
Khatami under a reform banner. Hence, they may be said
to represent the influence on legislation of Khomeini's novel
view of the role of religious law in the state, discussed
above.
210. See Halper, supra note 2, at 98-99.
211. See Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Women and Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran:
Divorce, Veiling and Emerging Feminist Voices, in WOMEN AND POLITICS IN THE
THIRD WORLD 142, 143-45 (Haleh Afshar ed., 1996).
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C. Compensating Women on Divorce
1. The Problem. Not until the Divorce Reform Law
of 1989 were the sources of law applying to marriage and
divorce in the IRI agreed upon, and legislation passed to
rationalize them with existing rules and opinions. 212 In
1992, that law was further amended, resulting in the
creation of a new family code that, while similar to the FPL,
went further in protecting women in respect to divorce and
custody.213 Thus, by the early nineties, the letter of the law
itself had changed to not only duplicate, but supplement the
discredited FPL in text as well as in practice.
One of the 1992 amendments, not ratified by religious
jurists of the Guardian Council until 1993, was a new
source of support for the divorced wife in the form of
compensation for the housework and childcare she had
undertaken during the course of the marriage. 214 In 1996, a
second right to compensation for the wife was added. Her
mahr, the marriage gift that serves as dower, was inflation-
indexed so that it retained its original value regardless of
the currency amount named in the document. It is the legal
framing of these two new rights of compensation that I
want to discuss.
In classical marriage law, the divorced wife has no right
to further financial support if the husband exercises his
talaq, or unilateral right to divorce for any reason or no
reason. 215 The marriage contract does not require anything
of the wife save tamkin, obedience and sexual services; it is
in return for this pledge that she is entitled to nafaqaa, or
ongoing maintenance during the course of the marriage,
212. See PAIDAR, supra note 122, at 276. These included, among other pieces
of legislation, the Civil Code of 1931, the FPL, and the 1979 law creating the
Special Civil Courts. POYA, supra note 188, at xvi.
213. MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 211, at 144.
214. Id.
215. In respect to this right, the parties to the marriage contract do not have
equal capacity to contract, for unilateral divorce is a gendered prerogative of the
husband. In this sense, the marriage is understood to be the "property" of the
husband, not of the wife. BABER JOHANSEN, CONTINGENCY IN A SACRED LAW:
LEGAL AND ETHICAL NORMS IN THE MUSLIM FIQH 204 (1999). Her property in the
marriage is her right to mahr and nafaqaa. She is otherwise neither competent
to enter into contracts as an equal, nor is her capacity to contract otherwise
affected by her marital status, either before or after the marriage.
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and the marriage gift capital sum similar to dower in the
common law, guaranteeing her maintenance in case he dies
or divorces her. She has no right to any post-divorce support
other than her mahr.216
The gift is due immediately upon marriage, but,
although it is the initial consideration paid by the man in
return for the woman's offer to enter into the marriage
contract, its payment is usually deferred at her pleasure or
until death or divorce. Because the mahr is meant to be a
capital sum, one capable of generating income sufficient to
maintain the wife in case of her husband's death or divorce,
its payment can be onerous for the husband.217 At divorce,
the mahr gives the wife some protection against inequities
in the gendered contract she has entered. If the husband
exercises his talaq, she is entitled to her mahr; this can
dissuade him from the divorce or push him to make other
arrangements for her post-divorce support. Alternatively,
she can waive the mahr to get custody of the children, for
whose support he remains responsible.
But if the mahr is no longer a capital sum, its utility to
the wife is lost, either as a source of support or as a
bargaining chip. With the inflation that has plagued Iran
for a quarter-century, the value of older dower gifts has
diminished tremendously. Indeed, the longer a woman has
been married, the more debilitating is adherence to a fixed
mahr amount. In the words of Marziyah Sidiqi, a woman
member of the Majles, when a woman is divorced, often the
mahr "won't even cover her taxi fare to court. '218 This led to
results recognized as inequitable by all.
A religious jurist who headed the Iranian judiciary, Ali
Akbar Nateq-Nouri, anecdotally described the consequences
in an interview given to Zan-e Ruz (Today's Woman), the
leading women's magazine in the country:
216. However, the husband remains responsible for supporting his children.
217. See Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Tamkin: Stories from a Family Court in Iran, in
EVERYDAY LIFE IN THE MUSLIM MIDDLE EAST 136, 148 (Donna Lee Bowen &
Evelyn A. Early eds., 2d ed. 2002).
218. In an official gathering of the Majles, the law for payment of women's
dowry in accordance with the inflation index was voted and passed, ZAN-E RUZ
(Iran), Dec. 28, 1996. (All translations from Zan-e Ruz used in this piece are by
Ali Korangy, Ph.D. Candidate in Middle Eastern Literature, Harvard
University, and are on file with the author.)
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Let's say after the woman has spent her youth there in that house,
after fifty or sixty years of marriage, a man decided to let her go
with the mahr of 100 or 200 tomans [now about a quarter]
designated in that period [when the marriage was contracted].
Well, considering the youth that has been lost and energy she has
spent . . . we can't just let her leave with change in her pocket.
This would be the ultimate injustice.2 19
Nateq-Nouri, a leading conservative later defeated in
his bid for the presidency by Mohammad Khatami, was
unlikely to have reached this position unless it was in fact
widely held.
The Majles made several attempts to deal with the
problem of support for divorced women. In 1982, at
Khomeini's wish, it had included in the form marriage
contract a provision that, if a divorce was based on the
husband's talaq, he had to split up to half the proceeds of
the marriage with his ex-wife. 220 This evened the playing
field somewhat: A woman could get a divorce only with her
husband's consent 221 and this consent meant forfeiting her
mahr. Now, the husband initiating a divorce could also be
held liable for a substantial sum. In that sense, divorce was
made onerous for both, despite the explicit shari'a principle
that the unilateral power of divorce was the husband's
alone.
This change in the contract terms provided protection
to women married after the new contract went into effect,
but not to those married under an old form of contract. Nor
did it fully protect even those married under the new form,
as it provided the wife "up to" half the income of the
219. The Question of Wages for Work is Worthy of Presentation to the World
Stage, ZAN-E Ruz (Iran), Dec. 4, 1993 (Interview with Ali-Akbar Nateq-Nouri).
220. Ziba Mir-Hosseini, MARRIAGE ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF ISLAMIC FAMILY LAw
57 (1993, rev. ed. 2000). Mir-Hosseini says that in her attendance at the divorce
court in Tehran in 1988, she came across no cases in which the claim to
proceeds of the marriage was raised. Id. at 58. Khomeini originally suggested
contractual incorporation of the delegation of the husband's talaq to the wife in
1980. KHOMEINI, supra note 137, at 58.
221. This form of divorce is known as khul, or consent divorce, and is in fact
the ground on which most divorces are granted in Tehran. MIR-HOSSEINI, supra
note 211, at 149. The husband agrees to release the wife from the marriage




marriage, rather than a guarantee of half.222 Hence,
another tack was tried.
2. Wages for Housework. As noted, the essence of the
marriage bargain is the trade of the wife's obedience,
tamkin, for her maintenance, nafaqaa, by the husband.
While it may be assumed that the wife will also maintain
the home and nurse the children, the contract itself does
not require it. This became a peg for the novel, but not
irreligious, notion that divorced women might be owed
wages for past housework and childcare. The woman who
does these things has not in effect been paid for her labor. 223
Payment of wages for housework is based on a key principle
of mu'amalat,224  or the religious account of human
relationships, that a fair price, ujrat al-mithal, should be
paid for any commodity, including the labor of a free
person.
By requiring wages for housework, as assessed by a
court at the time of divorce, the Majles was in effect
creating a right to payment for the wife in a form that
supplemented her deferred claim to her mahr. That wage
payment would come due in current dollars if the husband
exercised his contractual power of unilateral divorce. This
time, the Majles not only required that the form contract
include the provision that the wife was due her wages in
case of divorce, 225 but also made it possible for a woman
married under the old form of contract to get wages for
222. Determination of Wages for Work Done, ZAN-E Ruz (Iran), December 18,
1993.
223. The social failure to compensate women's domestic labor in the divorce
context is also problematized by American feminists. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams,
Feminism and Post-Structuralism, 88 MICH L. REV. 1776, 1788-89 (1990)
(reviewing ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, THE FEMALE BODY OF THE LAW (1988)) ("just as
[housework/childcare] is invisible inside marriage, it is invisible upon divorce.
So when judges make support or property awards, they often ignore completely
or seriously undervalue the economic worth of those services. . . . [Slociety
demands work from women and then refuses to acknowledge that women are
doing it, or even that it is 'work' at all.").
224. Unlike ibadat, matters of worship, mu'amalat, matters of relations
between people,, are not immutable and are open to rational argument and
modification. It is thus significant that, although marriage is considered a
religious duty and thus ibadat, the legal aspects of marriage are treated as
mu'amalat. Mir-Hosseini, supra note 13, at 11.
225. See id. at 14.
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housework implied into the old contract judicially, if a court
found she had not agreed to contribute her work without
pay.226 Thus, even a woman married before the right to
wages became explicit might be entitled to receive them.227
This change was broadly accepted. Nateq-Nouri
stressed that the government was "proud of this
[legislation] for it proves that women can have a secondary
means of resuming their lives" in addition to the marriage
gift.228 He also placed the change in a temporal context:
"The great thing about this law is that not every husband
nowadays can assume that divorce is easy and hence ruin a
household's life." 229 Thus, even the conservative Nateq-
Nouri recognized and accepted this provision not simply as
a matter of fairness, but as a change requisite in the
context of the times, despite the fact that it meant
discouraging unilateral divorce, a power explicitly available
to the husband under shari'a. In other words, in order to
protect the family and home, it was appropriate for the
Islamic Republic's legislature to add difficulties to the
exercise of the power granted in the contract that adhered
to the shari'a account of marriage. This appeal to the social
context is a continual theme in public discussions of the law
of marriage and divorce.
But even after the legislation implementing wages for
housework, problems remained. For one thing,
compensation was only due if the divorce was not the wife's
fault.230 And if the court decided her contribution had been
uncompensated at her own wish, or that the custom of her
community was to expect such labor be uncompensated, the
husband would not be charged to pay for it.231 Not only
226. ZAN-E Ruz supra note 222.
227. Id.
228. ZAN-E Ruz supra note 219.
229. Id.
230. ZAN-E Ruz, supra note 222. Dr. Safai questioned why uncompensated
labor should be tolerated even if the woman was at fault. He was "of the opinion
that a woman should also be able to request a determination of wages even if
she is at fault in a divorce. If a woman has this right then why shouldn't it exist




might the exceptions create a large loophole,232 but even the
woman entitled to compensation for wages had the burden
of proving the amount due. Nor did it provide the same
level of protection to long-married women, who had to
persuade a judge as to their entitlement, as it did to those
married after 1993, when the form of contract changed. Of
course, it was the longer-married women who were most in
need of protection.
3. Inflation-Indexing the Mahr. The resolution to the
problem of these women came in 1996, when the Majles bit
the bullet and explicitly required that the mahr, the
marriage gift, be inflation-indexed to the price of gold as
reported by the Central Bank of Iran.233 There was
substantial opposition to the measure, which passed 106-79,
with seventeen abstentions. 234 Debate in the Majles was
heated, with opponents arguing that the new law would
"disable the traditionally recognized warm sphere of family
life" 235 and "destroy the economic basis of the country. 236
But the proponents of the new law argued that the law
was consonant with shari'a, stressing that inflation-
indexing could be implied into the contract because time
and place are meaningful in Islamic jurisprudence. 237 They
also urged that "social justice"238 required consideration of
232. However, in Nateq-Nouri's view, only an explicit ante hoc renunciation
of her entitlement to wages would serve to defeat her subsequent claim: "If she
says from the start, I don't want it, then that's the only condition under which
she cannot pursue it. If she doesn't say it, it doesn't mean it is for free." ZAN-E
RUZ, supra note 219.
233. ZAN-E Ruz, supra note 218. In 1988, the Majles had decided that
payment of the mahr in full was a limiting condition on men's ability to divorce
legally. Mir-Hosseini, supra note 155, at 34.
234. ZAN-E Ruz, supra note 218.
235. Id. (quoting remarks of Mu'allami, representative from Qa'im Shahr).
236. Id. (quoting remarks of an unnamed representative from Bandar
Abbas).
237. Id. (citing remarks of Majid Ansari, a member of the MajIes from
Tehran). The jurisprudence of time and place asserts that "while the Quran is
the word of God, God spoke to people in terms which they could understand,
which makes the utterances relative to the milieu of their reception." ZUBAIDA,
supra note 10, at 222.
238. ZAN-E Ruz, supra note 218 (quoting remarks of Marziyah Sidiqi).
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inflation since the original date of the contract. 239 Once
again, the view of the proponents of inflation-indexing
seemed to reflect a larger consensus.
Even a conservative religious figure, Ayatollah
Makarimi-Shirazi, supported the provision, finding it
consonant with Islamic law: "If a woman was promised ...
[a capital sum and] substantial time passes since the
promise and inflation goes up exponentially . . . then she
must get paid according to the inflation. ' 240 Like Nateq-
Nouri, he too stressed that "we don't hand over the
management of a divorce entirely to a man,"241 though he
understood "popular belief' was to the contrary. Again, the
divergence with the traditional view of talaq is marked.
This change in the law passed the Majles, but not the
Council of Guardians, the non-elected body of lay lawyers
and religious jurists constitutionally mandated to review all
legislation for its compatibility with Islam. Hence it was
referred to the Expediency Council, which saw the wisdom
of allowing passage of the law, regardless of the stance of
the Guardian Council. 242 Thus, both wages for housework
and the inflation-indexed mahr, each an attempt to create a
more equitable framework for divorce, were approved not
only by elected representatives, but by religious leaders as
well. 243 The pressure for such changes in the divorce law
was widely felt and, at the same time, Khomeini's
insistence on contextualization of law in the Islamic state
made it possible, even as it was necessary, for these forces
to prevail.
The question women had placed on the agenda of the
IRI was how their position in a marriage contract,
239. Id. (quoting remarks of Majid Ansari, a religious figure and legal
scholar, who said, "If we didn't consider the rate of inflation [in other areas of
economic life], then many who owed lots of money would quickly discharge their
debt.").
240. The New Law Regarding the Woman's Dowry, the Conditions of Divorce
and Blood Money, ZAN-E Ruz (Iran), Dec. 21, 1996 (quoting a BBC interview
with Ayatollah Makarimi-Shirazi).
241. Id.
242. Mir-Housseini, supra note 211, at 245.
243. That suggests the outcome of the 2005 election, which created a more




understood as binding parties with unequal power to
contract, 24 4 could be improved without violating either the
substance or the spirit of that law. The substance of the law
could not be violated by changing the revealed law, as
annulling men's unilateral power of divorce would require,
nor by making that power directly available to either
spouse.245 And the law's spirit could not be violated by
introducing an alien conception like natural right into an
obligation-based theory.
In the case of both wages for housework and the
inflation-indexed mahr, the solution was the legislative
addition and/or permission for judicial implication of terms
to the contract, 246 a fairly standard procedure wherever a
legal regime of contract is recognized. The parties to a
contract may fail to foresee events that have impact on
their expectations of the contract or they may have
naturalized some foundational element of contract, failing
to recognize its temporal limitations. A judge may imply a
term, assuming that the parties omitted to make explicit
understandings that were nonetheless shared and which
might be discovered by reasoning from other contract terms
or the contract as a whole. Alternatively, the parties may
make a contract at least initially acceptable to both, but
which has social consequences beyond the bargain made by
the parties. In that case, the legislature may decide that
such contracts should include a particular term because
244. The marriage contract is gendered in a variety of ways, including the
husband's unilateral power of divorce and his ability to enter into other such
contracts at the same time, both of which are denied to the female party to the
contract.
245. Thus, Khomeini himself, while hinting that women's power to initiate
divorce should be the same as that of men, said in 1982 that he "lacked the
courage" to propose such a solution. Mir-Hosseini, supra note 155, at 33.
Khomeini finessed that by allowing the delegation of talaq to the wife in the
original marriage contract. Although the delegation was not required, its
inclusion in the form contract under which most people are wed made
delegation accessible to most couples where it had previously been limited to
those knowledgeable enough to insert the provision on their own. See supra text
accompanying notes 242-43.
246. This had originally been done in 1982 when the legislature, at
Khomeini's request, included twelve conditions in the form of a marriage
contract which, if accepted by both parties, gave the wife, acting as her
husband's agent, the power to initiate divorce herself. Mir-Hosseini, supra note
155, at 34.
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such an outcome is socially necessary. In my view, that is
the position the Majles adopted in respect to compensation
for the divorced wife by means either of wages for work or
the inflation-indexed mahr. The contract itself, originally
seen as private, came to be understood as a bargain to
which the state was at least implicitly a party.
No rule says women must do housework, although by
custom they do. Since they are not required to do it by law,
they must do it of their own will. That does not mean the
labor that provides a benefit to the husband should be
unpaid. Rather, as in any contract, the exercise of free will
to provide a benefit to another is also for the contracting
party's own benefit. Thus, the party's labor, though freely
given, is entitled to compensation, since she is not a slave,
but a person capable of the exercise of will. Hence, the labor
must be paid, should she seek such compensation, because
mu'amalat, the divine account of justice among those
within society, depends upon widespread adherence to such
a social agreement.
As to the marriage gift, it is designed to provide a
woman who chooses to marry, and hence, to foreclose other
life opportunities, with a guarantee of continued support
regardless of the fate of her marriage or her husband. She
is entitled to claim the mahr at any time, but having chosen
to defer payment, her future ought not to be disabled by her
self-denying choice to allow her husband to retain the
capital sum until she in fact is faced with one of the two
potential catastrophes of her widowhood or divorce. The
enforcement of the mahr's value in a currency-denominated
amount would disable her and possibly injure her family to
the detriment, the Majles felt, of society, as can be read in
the public debates on the issue.247
247. A similar outcome had occurred in a non-gender context as well.
Shari'a considers the employer-employee relationship as one of private contract.
But a state labor code was a demand of important sectors of the revolutionary
coalition, which would not be satisfied merely with minimal regulation of
workplace hygiene and safety. How could the state provide protection to
workers within the context of a contract between employer and employee? The
resolution was to claim the state was a party to the contract by virtue of the
support it provided to employers by making available a variety of support
services for commerce and industry, including energy, infrastructure, and
monetary and economic policies inter alia. See ZUBAIDA supra note 10, at 203-
04. On this basis, a labor code emerged in 1990 that had "many points in




These arguments-for social justice, family protection,
contextual interpretation to promote spousal equity-
though couched in the language of religion, have reference
to a social outcome and imply a social setting within which
an outcome must not only be fair to the participants but
also serve society. It is possible to characterize the outcome
as consonant with religion and, given the commitment of
the state to religious law, it is necessary to do so. But that
is certainly not the outcome required by religion, and it is at
least unexpected from the "shari'a state." In fact, one must
conclude that the political context is at least as important
as the revealed law in producing these results. But as
Zubaida says, "The insistence in modern pronouncements
on [shari'a's] fixed and unvarying nature as the law of God
for all time is not supported by an examination of its history
and function. '248
We have seen that Shi'is did not view their religious
law as part of the existing state, whose legitimacy was in
any case already provisional for them. Thus, when
Ayatollah Khomeini found it necessary to intervene in
politics because he believed the state was becoming too
hostile to religion, he did so under the authority of Islam.
Religion was in opposition to the state and hence, in some
sense, itself a contender for state power. But on taking
power, Khomeini was forced to reconceive the authoritative
place of Islam in a state committed to divine law and guided
by religious leaders. In the event, he found that, for a
variety of reasons, the Islamic state required more than
Islamic law.
One of the ways in which that was clearly true was that
women, though in the main supporters of the revolutionary
Islamic state over the Pahlavi dynasty, refused to be
governed, in their marriage, family- and work-lives, by a
tradition of jurisprudence that both threatened to remove
them from public life and disadvantaged them in the
private life. Because of their importance as supporters of
as with the labour laws of other countries." Id. at 205 (citing SCHIRAZI, supra
note 141, at 214). That code was also opposed by the Guardian Council and
required Khomeini's approval, contrary to his earlier writings, and the
intervention of the Expediency Council. See ZUBAIDA, supra note 10, at 204.
248. ZUBAIDA supra note 10, at 221.
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the IRI, they were able to win changes in the law of the new
religious state. New interpretations of gender law were
rationalized both as representing the social justice of the
Islamic state, and the contextualized application of shari'aT
to a particular time and place.
In sum, the "shari'a state" created by Khomeini's view
of the necessity of Islamic rule did not in fact apply shari'a
in the same way as its adherents had understood it before
the state underwent its great political change. The
authority of law, even religious law, in the new state
depended upon the authority of the state. In some sense,
the traditional view of revealed law did not capture all the
authoritative bases of action in a state governed by a
human understanding of God's purposes.249 But, on the
other hand, the uniquely Shi'i notion of the continuous
leadership of the Twelfth Imam, hidden from human sight,
but always present, and the consequent expectation of
imminent and immanent justice in the world, already
provided a basis for flexibility and expansion in the
jurisprudence of that community's scholars.
Khomeini himself expanded his view, and the state's
view, of its bases of action, allowing an inward, what one
might even call an Imamic, account of those purposes to
trump, if necessary, the outward prescriptions of the
revealed law previously understood to describe them. If
possible, shari'a, through a dynamic jurisprudence, must be
expanded from private law into the law of the state. But if
that was not possible, even in the "sharia state," the
interests of the state must take precedence. And where the
interests of the state were consonant with those of its
women supporters, that view was to their benefit.
249. CONSTITUTION, supra note 27. Iranian Constitution recognizes "[d]ivine
revelation and its fundamental role in setting forth the laws," art. 2, sec. 2,
"continuous leadership (imamah) and perpetual revelation," sec. 4, and the
"continuous ijtihad" of qualified scholars, sec. 6. Together these-God, the
Mahdi and the marjaiyat-suggest an earthly and divine dialectic in the
legislative process.
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